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“Like many businessmen of genius he learned that free competition was wasteful, 





Investors, employees, and regulators are still reeling from the recent 
spectacular accounting improprieties committed by the largest of U.S. 
corporations. Fraud and scandal at Enron Corporation2 and WorldCom, 
Inc.3  drove them each into bankruptcy less than eight months apart.  At 
 
 
1. MARIO PUZO, THE GODFATHER 213 (Signet 1978) (1969). 
2. On December 2, 2001, Enron Corporation, the once-multibillion dollar 
energy company and strident advocate for energy deregulation, hobbled into bankruptcy 
after having made a series of startling disclosures concerning financial misreporting and 
serious conflicts of interest. On October 16, 2001, the company announced a $1 billion 
charge against its third-quarter earnings to correct for other accounting errors related to the 
financing of affiliated entities. The next day, the Wall Street Journal reported that $35 
million of Enron’s losses related to its dealings with two partnerships run by its chief 
financial officer, Andrew Fastow. See Kurt Eichenwald with Diana B. Henriques, Enron 
Buffed Image to a Shine Even as It Rotted From Within, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, at A1. 
In November, the firm announced that it had overstated earnings from 1997 forward by 
$586 million, a reporting error due primarily to improper accounting for its dealings with 
affiliated entities.  A corrected restatement of its earnings reduced profits for the period by 
twenty percent. See John R. Emshwiller et al., Enron Slashes Profits Since 1997 by 20%, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2001, at A3. In fact, for months Enron had been hiding hundreds of 
millions of dollars in losses by stashing them on the books of nominally independent 
affiliated entities. A substantial portion of its profits over a four-year period were 
apparently generated through accounting  manipulations. See SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 
COMM. OF THE BD. OF DIRS. OF ENRON CORP., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (Feb. 1, 2002). 
At its peak stock price near $90 per share in August 2000, Enron was America’s 
seventh largest corporation by market capitalization. William W. Bratton, Does 
Corporate Law Protect the Interests of Shareholders and Other Stakeholders?: Enron and 
the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TULANE L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2002). By the time 
of Enron’s bankruptcy, investors in the company had seen $63 billion in market value 
wiped out in less than a year. See Peter Coy et al., Enron: Running on Empty, BUS. WK., 
Dec. 10, 2001, at 80. Enron employees were among those unfortunate investors. At the 
end of 2000, their company pension plan held $2.1 billion in assets, of which $1.3 billion 
consisted of Enron stock. That stock is now worthless. See Theo Francis & Ellen Schultz, 
Enron Faces Suits by 401(k) Plan Participants, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2001, at C1. 
3. On July 21, 2002, telecommunications giant WorldCom, Inc. filed for 
bankruptcy  on  the  heels  of  the  company’s  announcement  that  it  had  “misstated” 
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the time of their respective filings, each enjoyed the dubious honor of 
being the largest bankruptcy filing in history.4 Responding to these and 
other illegalities, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the 
Department of Justice, numerous Congressional committees, and the New 
York State Attorney General’s Office all launched investigations. The 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) formed a Corporate Accountability 
and Listing Standards Committee to recommend corporate governance 
reform.5 Corporate officers have been indicted for securities fraud.6 
Numerous civil suits have been filed on behalf of investors.7 And 
Congress and the NYSE have imposed far reaching new corporate 




expenses—and thus overstated profits—in 2001 and the first quarter of 2002 by $3.85 
billion. Later disclosures admitted that for a period from 1999 through 2002, the firm had 
overstated profits by at least $7.2 billion, a figure that likely makes it the largest 
accounting fraud in history. Jared Sandberg & Susan Pulliam, WorldCom Revision Might 
Double, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2002, at A3. In addition, its former CEO borrowed $400 
million from the company before he was ousted, a sum he still owes. Steven Rosenbush et 
al., Inside the Telecom Game: How a Small Group of Insiders Made Billions as the 
Industry Collapsed, BUS. WK., Aug. 5, 2002, at 34. 
4. Shawn Young et al., WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., Jul. 22, 
2002, at A3; Wendy Zellner et al., The Fall of Enron, BUS. WK., Dec. 17, 2001, at 33. In 
its filing, WorldCom listed $107 billion in assets, while Enron’s filing involved a “mere” 
$63.4 billion in assets. Young, supra, at A3. 
5. See  generally  N.Y.  STOCK  EXCH.,  YOUR  MARKET:  STRAIGHT  TALK  FOR 
INVESTORS (July 2002). 
6. See Jerry Markon & Jared Sandberg, Ex-WorldCom Officials Are Indicted, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2002, at A3. 
7. See, e.g., Francis & Schultz, supra note 2; New York Fund to Lead 
WorldCom Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2002, at B4. 
8. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the most sweeping corporate 
regulatory statute since the Great Depression. See Public Company Accounting Reform 
and Investor Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.). Among other things, the Act 
imposes requirements as to (i) officer certification of firms’ annual and quarterly reports, 
see id. 15 U.S.C. § 7241, (ii) the composition and function of corporate boards’ audit 
committees, see id. § 78j-1, and (iii) the independence of outside auditors, see id. §§ 78c, 
78g, 78j-1, 78l. The Act also establishes a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
to oversee outside auditors of public companies, see id. §§ 77s, 78m, 7211-7219, and 
creates new criminal offenses and raises penalties for some existing offenses, see id. 
§§ 7242, 7244. Proposed NYSE rules impose requirements as to director independence 
and the composition, function, and authority of non-management directors and boards’ 
audit compensation, and nominating/governance committees. Each listed company must 
adopt and disclose corporate governance guidelines and a code of business conduct and 
ethics. The new rules also require shareholder approval of almost all stock option plans. 
See NYSE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RULE PROPOSALS REFLECTING RECOMMENDATIONS 
COMMITTEE AS APPROVED BY THE NYSE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, August 1, 2002, available 
at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp_gov_pro_b.pdf. The proposed rules are subject to SEC 
approval and are expected to be approved.  See Kip Betz, NYSE Board Approves Changes 
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as well, searching for models of transparency and accountability for their 
securities laws, have reconsidered their earlier embrace of the U.S. 
example.9 
It is ironic that during this period of corporate scandal and regulatory 
soul searching, one of the most spirited debates among corporate and 
securities law scholars has focused on reform proposals for international 
securities regulation that essentially call for corporate self-regulation. 
According to these proposals—one by Roberta Romano of Yale Law 
School,10 and the other by Stephen Choi and Andrew Guzman at Boalt 
Hall11—an issuer of securities should be allowed to choose the regime of 
securities regulation that will govern it, and all nations would commit to 
respecting each firm’s particular choice of securities law. Each firm 
would be allowed to select the securities regulatory regime of any 
country, and have that chosen regulation govern the firm’s securities 
activities in every country.12 Given the choice, the argument goes, each 
issuer would pick the regulatory regime that offers the optimal level of 
regulation for itself and its investors. Proponents assert, therefore, that 
this “issuer choice” approach achieves efficient securities regulation on a 
global basis. 
Existing regulation and regulatory practice in the world are 
inefficient, according to issuer choice advocates. As currently structured, 
securities regulation is territorial. That is, each nation claims exclusive 
jurisdiction to regulate securities transactions that occur within its 
borders. This is problematic for issuer choice proponents. Because each 
national regulator insists on exclusivity in regulating the offering, selling, 
and trading of securities within its national borders, territoriality 
effectively grants each regulator a national “monopoly” on regulation. As 
monopolists,  regulators  have  insufficient  incentive  to  offer  efficient 
 
 
to Corporate Governance Listing Standards, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 1269 (BNA) (Aug. 5, 
2002). 
9. See A Whiff of Impropriety: Corporate Wrongdoing in Japan, THE 
ECONOMIST, Aug. 3, 2002, at 54-55 (discussing Japanese accounting reform efforts). 
10. See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to 
Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998) [hereinafter Romano, Empowering 
Investors]; Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities 
Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387 (2001) [hereinafter Romano, Need for 
Competition]. Romano has recently published a book-length treatment of her proposal. 
See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM IN SECURITIES 
REGULATION (2002). 
11. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking 
the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998) 
12. This is tantamount to self-regulation since presumably a country exists that 
would oblige the regulatory desires of any firm willing to pay an appropriate fee. 
International tax, banking, and bankruptcy havens provide useful analogies. See infra note 
17 and accompanying text. 
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rules—the rules that issuers and investors would prefer.13 Instead, 
national regulators are free to benefit themselves and favored constituents 
through their rulemaking,14 at the expense of issuers and investors. 
The issuer choice antidote to this curse of regulatory monopoly is, of 
course, competition. In effect, proponents of issuer choice call for the 
creation of an international market in securities regulation. In this market, 
regulation itself is the product, one that nations would “sell” and firms 
and investors would “buy.” National regulators and other law givers in 
each nation would “supply” securities regulation in this market. And the 
consumers of securities laws, of course, are issuers and investors. Free to 
choose their securities laws, they would make up the market “demand.”15 
With firms free to choose their law, national regulators would be forced to 
compete to supply desirable regulation. 
Not surprisingly, the issuer choice idea has sparked a spirited debate 
among scholars, and has even captured the attention of the popular 
press.16 Under issuer choice, securities law should never be mandatory 
but should be a matter for firms’ private choice. Issuers may choose any 
regulation or no regulation,17 and while issuer choice advocates express 
confidence that market forces will prod most issuers to submit to 
nontrivial regulation, policy makers throughout the world would have to 
be prepared to honor an issuer’s choice of “no regulation.”18 
To date, the primary challenge to issuer choice has been that it will 
not “work” as predicted. Scholars have focused primarily on the demand 
side of the market for regulation—questioning whether the behavior of 
firms and investors would truly create a demand for efficient law. Merritt 
Fox doubts that firm managers have the right incentives to choose optimal 
regulation,19 and Jim Cox has questioned whether investors in the market 
 
 
13. Another problem for Choi & Guzman is that some nations, like the United 
States, may sometimes extend the reach of their laws to apply extraterritorially. This may 
raise concerns over conflicts with other nations’ laws. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. 
Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities Law, 17 NW. J. INT’L 
L. & BUS. 207 (1996). 
14. This private interest view of regulatory behavior is a fairly standard 
perspective in the public choice literature. See infra Part I.B.3. 
15. A firm’s managers would select the regulatory regime applicable to the firm, 
and investors would choose the firms in which they prefer to invest, presumably taking 
account of each firm’s chosen regulatory regime. 
16. See The Market for Regulation, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 7, 1998, at 82. 
17. Choi has made this point explicitly. See Stephen J. Choi, Promoting Issuer 
Choice in Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 815, 816 (2001). 
18. With issuer choice, Enron and WorldCom, for example, could have avoided 
indictments, lawsuits, and investigations had they simply elected to be governed by a 
regulatory regime compatible with the creative accounting they each practiced. 
19. See Merritt B. Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
563,  564  (2001)  [hereinafter  Fox,  The  Issuer  Choice  Debate];  Merritt  B.  Fox,  The 
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can efficiently price differences in regulatory regimes.20 By contrast, this 
Article focuses on a different question: not on whether issuer choice 
would work but on whether it would ever happen. This important 
question has yet to be explored in the scholarly literature. My claim is 
that issuer choice is politically implausible. I examine the supply side of 
the market for securities regulation, focusing on choice of law rules and 
the incentives of political actors to supply them. I argue that given the 
stated assumptions of issuer choice advocates, issuer choice is very 
unlikely ever to come about. 
For the issuer choice model to work, national regulators must supply 
two different types of rules—not only substantive securities regulation, 
but choice of law rules as well. In particular, each nation would have to 
forswear its customary territorial jurisdiction over securities activity that 
occurs within its borders. Instead, it would have to agree that for each 
firm engaging in securities activity within its territory, it would apply the 
securities law that the firm had selected. While analysts on all sides have 
discussed the dynamics of competition over substantive rules, they have 
ignored the  fact that competition over substantive rules requires 
cooperation among nations in structuring the international market in 
which the various nations would compete over substantive rules. This 
requires that states agree on a choice of law rule honoring firm choice. 
But there is a problem. Issuer choice proposals rely critically on 
standard public choice assumptions about the incentives and motivations 
of political actors.21 Under these assumptions, regulators in general desire 
to aggrandize their bureaucracies, and with securities regulation, they do 
this by maximizing the number of firms and transactions under their 
regulatory purview. For issuer choice, this explains why regulators would 
compete to offer desirable securities law if firms were free to choose their 
own laws. Each national regulator would wish to maximize the number 
of firms adopting her laws in order to enhance the scope and importance 
of her bureaucracy. 
On these assumptions, however, it is difficult to see how the 
appropriate choice of law rules could emerge, or how international 
agreement on them could be reached. In a word, we can’t get there from 




Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in a Globalizing Market for 
Securities, 97 MICH. L. REV. 696, 749 (1998) [hereinafter Fox, Political Economy]; 
Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not 
Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1345 (1999) [hereinafter Fox, Retaining 
Mandatory Securities Disclosure]; see also infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
20. See  James  D.  Cox,  Regulatory  Duopoly  in  U.S.  Securities  Markets,  99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1200, 1234 (1999); see also infra text accompanying note 96. 
21. See infra Part I.B.3. 
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regulators to compete, if an international market for regulation existed, 
would also make them unwilling to supply the choice of law rules 
essential to creating that market in the first place, at least in important 
jurisdictions. Regulators with cozy regulatory monopolies, intent on 
aggrandizing their bureaucracies, would oppose competition. They would 
not agree to respect firms’ private choice of securities regulation, since 
that would expose their bureaucracies to challenge. Rather than 
surrendering their national monopolies, they would instead fight to 
preserve their protected markets. 
I also consider the possibility that other national lawmakers— 
legislators and executives—could supply the requisite choice of law rules 
for issuer choice. But I ultimately discount that possibility. Informational 
advantages will enable regulators to play a dominant role in formulating 
policy on international securities regulation, making it difficult for 
legislators or executives to initiate fundamental reform that regulators 
oppose. In addition, interest groups in important jurisdictions will not 
support issuer choice, making it even less likely that legislators or 
executives would take up the cause. For argument’s sake, I remain true to 
the public choice assumptions adopted by issuer choice advocates in order 
to show the  difficulty of  telling a  consistent issuer choice story that 
includes the necessary choice of law rules. A public choice approach 
suggests a move not toward issuer choice, but toward “regulatory price 
discrimination” by important jurisdictions, as well as possible  efforts 
toward increased international harmonization. I rely primarily on 
examples from U.S. law in my analysis, generalizing to other countries 
where appropriate. 
Part I of the Article provides background. It discusses the strains 
placed on national regulatory regimes by global securities markets, and it 
describes the main issuer choice proposals. Part II discusses regulators’ 
calculus in the face of issuers’ and investors’ increasing international 
mobility. It describes the opportunities and constraints of regulators in 
different types of jurisdictions in terms of pursuing their private interests. 
In “price-setting jurisdictions,” regulators will pursue regulatory price 
discrimination, not issuer choice. Part III examines the probable 
influences of interest groups on the prospects for achieving the 
international choice of law cooperation required for issuer choice. It 
argues that regulators will dominate legislators and executives in setting 
policy on international securities regulation, and that no interest group 
would unambiguously support issuer choice. Part IV concludes. 
 
I. BACKGROUND: THE CURRENT TERRITORIAL SYSTEM AND ISSUER 
CHOICE PROPOSALS 
 
In this Part, I begin by describing the territorial system that currently 
prevails in the world and efforts by regulators to adapt national regulation 
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to the global securities market. With the increasing international mobility 
of issuers and investors, it becomes more and more common that 
activities in one country may affect securities markets in others. In the 
face of this phenomenon, national regulators may have difficulty 
enforcing their national laws or protecting their national markets from 
effects that originate abroad. I describe two different adaptive 
approaches—extraterritoriality and harmonization—that aim to assure the 
effectiveness of national regulation. U.S. law illustrates regulators’ 
extraterritorial tendency. It shows a tension between nominal territoriality 
and national regulators’ temptation to extend their reach—regulating 
transactions with fairly weak connections to their domestic securities 
markets—in order to assure the effectiveness of their national laws. This 
extraterritorial tendency may lead to conflicts of law, as national 
regulatory systems overlap in their regulatory efforts. 
Harmonization, the second approach, involves nations’ attempts to 
align substantive policies and cross-border enforcement efforts. Through 
this coordinated approach, national regulators hope to vindicate national 
policies and prevent their easy circumvention by actors that might 
otherwise seek out lax jurisdictions in which to conduct securities 
activities.22 
Issuer choice advocates condemn both these approaches as mere 
attempts by regulators to extend the reach of their territorial monopolies. 
After describing this uneasy fit between national regulation and 
international transactions, I sketch the issuer choice approach as proposed 
separately by Romano23 and Choi and Guzman.24 While distinctive in the 
details, the central argument in both proposals is that issuers should be 
allowed to choose the regime of securities regulation under which they 
will be governed worldwide. I then introduce the problem of choice of 
law cooperation, which would be necessary to create the international 










22. For example, when a company lists its securities for trading on multiple 
exchanges in different countries, prohibitions against insider trading in one country can 
easily be circumvented by trading on the exchange of another country that has not adopted 
or does not enforce the same prohibitions. 
23. See Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 10, at 388-89; Romano, 
Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 2361-62. 
24. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 907. 
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A. National Regulation, International Transactions 
 
As with most laws, the reach of securities law is nominally 
territorial.25 A nation typically applies its securities laws to securities 
transactions that occur within its borders, or that have substantial effects 
within its territory.26 For example, in the United States, every issuer that 
lists its securities for trading on the NYSE is required to register under 
Section 12(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)27 
and becomes subject to periodic disclosure and reporting requirements 
under that statute.28 This requirement applies whether the issuer is a 
foreign corporation or a domestic one. On the other hand, a U.S. issuer 
engaging in a  public  offering  of  its securities abroad must  generally 
comply with the laws of the jurisdiction in which the offering is made, but 
provided certain conditions are met,29 the issuer is not required to comply 
with the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 
(Securities Act), which regulates public offerings in the United States.30 
If each nation regulates only territorially, then at least conceptually, 
conflicts of law can be avoided. With securities regulation, though, as in 
many other areas, the conceptual tidiness of this territorial principle has 
been rendered illusory. It has been strained by the  ever-increasing 
volume of cross-border securities offerings and trading. A Japanese 
investor purchasing shares of a Dutch company listed on the NYSE, for 
instance, is routine. Technological progress has made investors  and 
issuers increasingly more mobile.  Firms can readily offer and sell, and 
 
 
25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987) 
(describing bases of prescriptive jurisdiction).  “Territoriality is considered the normal   . . 
. basis for the exercise of jurisdiction.” Id. § 402 cmt. b. 
26. The Restatement views the effects principle as an aspect of territoriality, 
while recognizing that it is sometimes considered a distinct category. See id. § 402 cmt. d. 
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a) (2000). 
28. See id. § 78m(a)-(h). The Exchange Act is the primary legislation relating to 
regulation of national securities exchanges, among other things. 
Daimler Benz felt the sting of U.S. reporting requirements when it decided to list its 
shares on the NYSE in 1993.  See Cox, supra note 20, at 1203. Daimler’s shares had been 
listed only in Germany before 1993. See id. One nagging requirement for the firm in 
listing in the United States and reporting under U.S. securities laws was the requirement to 
reconcile its books to U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).   See id. 
U.S. GAAP accounting made transparent Daimler’s practice, under more liberal German 
accounting rules, of smoothing out earnings from year to year by in effect hiding earnings 
as “reserves” in the more profitable years, and then drawing on those reserves in less 
profitable years to boost earnings in those leaner years. See id. The contrasting results of 
these accounting rules were made clear in the very first year of Daimler’s U.S. listing, 
when it reported a $354 million profit under German accounting standards, but a loss of $1 
billion under U.S. GAAP. See id. 
29. See Regulation S Rules 901-905, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.905 (2002). 
30. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2000). 
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investors can readily buy and trade, securities outside their home 
countries. But which countries’ laws should or should not apply to these 
cross-border transactions is not always clear. When conduct in  one 
country affects investors in another—say a fraudulent scheme is 
perpetrated through the conduct of actors in several countries and causes 
losses in yet another country—several nations may justifiably assert the 
application of their national securities laws. Conflicts will arise. Choice 
of law rules—allocating regulatory authority among sovereigns—become 
critical.31 However, international efforts to coordinate securities 
regulatory jurisdiction have been few and frustrating.32 Without clear 
choice of law, conflicting assertions of territorial jurisdiction subject 
transactions to multiple overlapping regulatory regimes, which may create 
conflicting legal obligations, deter desirable transactions, and cause 
tension among sovereigns.33 Scholars and policymakers are having to 
face the question squarely: what should be the appropriate relationship 
among national regulatory regimes? 
Policymakers may have difficulty devising a simple or 
straightforward answer, as U.S. law illustrates. U.S. securities law is 
basically territorial. However, in certain areas, specific rules and 
doctrines rely to some extent on extraterritorial reach in order to 
safeguard U.S. investors or the U.S. market from harm. U.S. law might 
therefore apply to predominantly foreign transactions, when exclusive 
application of other countries’ laws might be more appropriate. I discuss 
one example below: the Securities Act registration requirement and 
Regulation S, which addresses offshore public offerings. Regulation S 
illustrates the strain of attempting to apply territorial regulation to global 
securities markets and the temptation to extraterritorial reach. In addition, 
I briefly discuss one increasingly popular approach to international 
regulatory coordination: harmonization of regulatory standards among 
national securities regimes and the SEC’s efforts in that regard. 
 
 
31. As implied above, the focus here is primarily on prescriptive jurisdiction— 
jurisdiction to prescribe applicable rules—and not on judicial or other enforcement 
jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (discussing 
prescriptive jurisdiction). 
32. Even within the European Union (EU), which has steadfastly pursued 
regulatory coordination for decades, the results have not been encouraging. See Howell E. 
Jackson & Eric J. Pan, Regulatory Competition in International Securities Markets: 
Evidence from Europe in 1999-Part I, 56 BUS. LAW. 653, 676 (2001). Through its Public 
Offers Directive, for example, the EU attempted to create a “regulatory passport” system 
to enable issuers to make public offerings of securities throughout the EU relying only on 
their home country offering documents. See id. at 680. However, largely because of local 
regulatory protectionism, the Public Offers Directive is not useful and has had virtually no 
impact on public offerings within the EU. See id. at 680-81. 
33. See generally Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 
GEO. L.J. 883 (2002). 




1. SECURITIES ACT REGISTRATION AND REGULATION S 
 
For public offers and sales of securities, registration is generally 
required under the Securities Act.34 Section 5, the cornerstone for 
regulation of primary transactions in the United States,35 sets out the basic 
registration requirement. Registration requires the production of an 
extensive and complex disclosure document—the registration statement— 
meant to provide adequate information to enable investors to make their 
investment decisions.36 The registration statement must be filed with the 
SEC before offers to buy or sell a security may be made.37 In addition, 
the registration statement must be declared effective before any sale or 
delivery of securities may occur.38 
Through its promulgation of Regulation S,39 the SEC sought  to 
clarify application of the registration requirement to offshore offerings. 
In terms of extraterritorial reach, Section 5 nominally applies to all offers 
and sales of securities that “make use of any means or instruments of 
transportation or communication in interstate commerce.”40 Interstate 
commerce is defined quite broadly to include “trade or commerce in 
securities or any transportation or communication relating thereto . . . 
between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of 
Columbia.”41 
Read literally, this definition of interstate commerce could extend the 
reach of Section 5 to offerings by U.S. issuers made completely outside 
the United States to foreign investors. Historically, however, the SEC has 
never applied it so broadly. When questions of extraterritorial reach first 
arose in the 1960s, the SEC articulated its view that registration was 
meant primarily to protect U.S. investors. Therefore, registration would 




34. Numerous  exemptions  exist. See  THOMAS  LEE  HAZEN,  THE  LAW  OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION, at ch. 4 (4th ed. 2002). 
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e. 
36. See id. 
37. See id. § 77e(c). 
38. See id. § 77e(a)(1). 
39. See Regulation S Rules 901-905; 17 C.F.R. §§  230.901-.905;  see  also 
Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6863, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,524 at 80,661 (April 24, 1990) [hereinafter Regulation S 
Initial Release]; Offshore Offers and Sales (Regulation S), Securities Act Release No. 
7505, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,006, at 80,156 (Feb. 17, 1998) (amending Release No. 
6863). 
40. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1). 
41. Id. § 77b(7). 
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reasonably  designed  to  preclude  distribution  or  redistribution  of  the 
securities within, or to nationals of, the United States.”42 
Regulation S, promulgated in 1990 in order to clarify then-existing 
policy, declared the SEC’s explicit embrace of a territorial approach to 
Securities Act registration.43 Regulation S provides  safe  harbors  for 
offers and sales of securities “outside the United States,”44 so that 
registration is not required.45 “The territorial approach recognizes the 
primacy of the laws in which a market is located. As investors choose 
their markets, they choose the laws and regulations applicable in such 
markets.”46 This approach marked a shift from protecting U.S. investors 
generally to protecting “the U.S. capital markets and investors purchasing 
in the U.S. market, whether U.S. or foreign nationals.”47 
The Regulation S rules, however, may have extraterritorial effects 
that belie their proclaimed territorial aspiration. In particular, the 
regulation includes restrictions designed to prevent resale into the United 
States of securities initially offered abroad, or “flowback.”48 These 
flowback restrictions may directly affect wholly foreign  transactions, 
even though Regulation S was ostensibly meant to track a strictly 
territorial design. 
The basic definitions are not problematic. An issuer’s offer or sale 
of securities is deemed “outside the United States” if: 
 
(a) it is made only to persons outside the U.S.; 
(b) either 
(i) the purchasers are reasonably believed to be outside 
the U.S. when they originate their purchase orders, or 
(ii) the transactions are executed on an established foreign 
securities exchange; 
and 




42. MARC I. STEINBERG, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW: A CONTEMPORARY 
AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 183 (1999) (quoting Securities Act Release No. 4708 (July 
1964)). Through an initial release and subsequent no-action letters, the SEC crafted a 
policy attempting to assure that securities issued offshore by U.S. issuers came to rest 
abroad and did not flow back to the United States or to U.S. nationals. Id. 
43. See Regulation S Initial Release, supra note 39, at 80,665.  See also Choi & 
Guzman, supra note 13, at 210. 
44. Regulation S Initial Release, supra note 39, at 80,665. 
45. For discussions of the background and requirements of Regulation S, see 
Fox, Political Economy, supra note 19, at 708 and Choi & Guzman, supra note 13, at 210. 
46. See Regulation S Initial Release, supra note 39, at 80,665. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.902(h), 230.903(a). 




However, depending on the type of securities involved, additional 
restrictions aimed at preventing flowback into the United States may deter 
wholly foreign transactions and interfere with other nations’ securities 
markets.50 Offshore equity offerings by U.S. issuers, for example, may 
not include offers or sales to U.S. persons for one year,51 even if those 
investors signal their willingness to forego U.S. regulatory supervision by 
purchasing outside the United States. In addition, non-U.S. residents 
purchasing from the issuer must expressly agree to sell only to other non- 
U.S. purchasers, who agree to similar restrictions during the one-year 
period, and so on.52 Not only do these transfer restrictions circumscribe 
the ability of U.S. purchasers to opt out of U.S. regulation, as was 
originally advertised with Regulation S,53 but they effectively preclude 
issuers from listing shares issued under Regulation S for trading on a 
foreign exchange, since compliance with Regulation S would be made 
impossible.54 But the inability to list the shares makes them illiquid and 
therefore relatively unattractive, drastically reducing the utility of 
Regulation S equity offerings for U.S. issuers.55 
 
 
50. Id.  § 230.903(b). 
51. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii). This one-year period is referred to as the 
“distribution compliance period.” Id. § 230.902(f). A “U.S. person” includes individuals 
resident in the United States, partnerships and corporations organized under U.S. laws, and 
trusts of which any trustee is a U.S. person. Id. § 230.902(k)(1). 
52. See id. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii); see also Hal S. Scott, Internationalization of 
Primary Public Securities Markets, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 95 (2000) 
(describing restriction on reselling to U.S. persons during distribution compliance period). 
Equity securities of domestic issuers are also “restricted securities” under Rule 144.  17 
C.F.R. §§ 230.144, 230.905. Resale into the United States of such Regulation S securities 
may therefore also be subject to Rule 144 restrictions. 
53. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
54. In an impersonal, faceless stock exchange transaction, it would be practically 
impossible for a seller to prescreen purchasers based on their country of residence or to 
impose transfer restrictions as part of the transaction. 
55. See Fox, Political Economy, supra note 19, at 710 & n.33. Practical 
application of Regulation S and Exchange Act registration rules to U.S. issuers also makes 
it highly unlikely that even a U.S. firm that publicly offers shares only abroad could avoid 
U.S. disclosure rules. Even if a U.S. issuer made its Regulation S share offering and 
successfully avoided Securities Act registration, it is highly unlikely to be able to avoid 
Exchange Act registration and the concomitant disclosure obligations. Section 12(g)(1) 
and Rule 12g-1 of the Exchange Act together require registration by any issuer with $10 
million in assets and more than 500 shareholders of record. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1) 
(2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2002). For the U.S. issuer, whether its shareholders are 
foreign or domestic does not affect this registration requirement, which also triggers 
mandatory disclosure very similar to that mandated under the Securities Act for public 
offerings. See Fox, Political Economy, supra note 19, at 715 & n.47. The issuer’s 
reincorporation under the laws of a foreign country may make it marginally easier to avoid 
U.S. regulation. 
1376 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
 
 
Regulation S transfer restrictions may be necessary to prevent 
flowback and the dangers to U.S. investors of trading in unregistered 
securities.56 However, the restrictions significantly affect securities 
activity in other nations as well. Fear of flowback prevents U.S. investors 
from purchasing U.S. issuers’ equity offerings abroad, despite these 
investors’ apparent willingness to live with the regulatory protections of a 
foreign jurisdiction. Flowback concerns also preclude for a period the 
foreign listing of U.S. issuers’ shares, at the peril of having to comply 
with U.S. registration requirements! Regulation S thus has a significant 
impact on the possibilities for offshore equity offerings by U.S. issuers, 
even though under a territorial approach, the foreign jurisdiction’s 
regulation would generally be expected to play the primary role in setting 
the terms for offerings and listings within its borders. No doubt the risk 
of these U.S. securities finding their way back to the United States is a 
real one. However, the extraterritorial consequences of these rules also 
illustrate the difficulty of structuring putatively territorial regulation 
within neat territorial lines. 
Commentators have criticized U.S. extraterritoriality from different 
quarters. Not surprisingly, issuer choice advocates believe that U.S. law 
overregulates to begin with, and that expanding its international reach 
merely compounds the problem by impeding capital mobility and easy 
exit by investors.57 
 
2. HARMONIZATION EFFORTS 
 
In addition to some creeping extraterritoriality in U.S. law, the SEC 
and other national securities regulators have responded to international 
securities activities with attempts at harmonizing substantive standards 
and increasing cooperation in terms of information sharing and 
enforcement. The SEC has taken a leading role in these endeavors. It has 
 
 
A U.S.-listed foreign issuer may also find its wholly foreign offering subjected to 
annoying restrictions. For instance, if the foreign offering is made in two or more 
countries and there is “substantial U.S. market interest” in the security, not only are sales 
to U.S. persons precluded for forty days, but the issuer’s underwriter and other distributors 
must agree in writing that offers and sales will not run afoul of U.S. registration 
requirements, and all offering materials must state that the securities have not  been 
registered under the Securities Act and may not be offered or sold in the United States or 
to U.S. persons, absent registration or an available exemption. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b) 
(2002). 
56. See Problematic Practices Under Regulation S, Exchange Act Release No. 
33-7190, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,663 (July 10, 1995); Josh Futterman, Note, Evasion and 
Flowback in the Regulation S Era: Strengthening U.S. Investor Protection While 
Promoting U.S. Corporate Offshore Offerings, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 806 (1995). 
57. See Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 10, at 2362; Choi & 
Guzman, supra note 13. 
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been a leading proponent of harmonization through its participation in the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO),58 pushing 
other nations to adopt disclosure and accounting standards, insider trading 
prohibitions, and other rules comparable to those of the United States.59 
In addition, the SEC has executed Memoranda of Understanding with 
several dozen countries in order to facilitate information sharing in 
furtherance of extraterritorial enforcement of their respective domestic 
securities laws.60 
The SEC approach implies that all nations should adopt high 
regulatory standards similar to those operating in the United States. With 
greater international harmonization toward U.S. standards, issuers and 
investors would have more difficulty fleeing to lax jurisdictions to 
conduct their securities activities. On this view, territorial limitations on 
regulators’ reach are a problem to be overcome, since territorial 
competition for issuers and investors may result in a race to the bottom 
for regulatory standards. The SEC’s harmonization efforts respond to this 
perceived problem by pushing regulatory standards upward across the 
board. 
For issuer choice advocates, of course, this is exactly the wrong way 
to proceed. For them, the appropriate relationship among national 
regulatory regimes is as competitors, and the appropriate international 





58. IOSCO membership includes the national regulatory authorities of most 
nations. See Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, IOSCO Membership Lists, at 
http://www.iosco.org/memberslist.html (last modified Jan. 7, 2003). 
59. Foreign issuers in the Unites States now file their annual reports on form 20- 
F, adopted  by  the  SEC  in  1999,  which  conforms  to  IOSCO  international  disclosure 
standards. See International Disclosure Standards, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7745, 70 
SEC Docket (CCH), at 1474 (Sept. 28, 1999) (adopting release); see also INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS: THE SEC’S INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM 752 (PLI Order No. B0-017O 
February 2002) [hereinafter SEC’S INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM] (describing SEC 
involvement with IASB, IOSCO); Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, A Public 
Choice Model of International Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 
18 CARDOZO L. REV. 925, 953 (1996) (discussing harmonization of insider trading rules); 
David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International 
Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281, 302 (1998) (suggesting that 
“the SEC plays an overwhelmingly influential role in IOSCO” (citing TONY PORTER, 
STATES, MARKETS AND REGIMES IN GLOBAL FINANCE 122-23 (1993))). 
60. See SEC’S INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM, supra note 59, at 772-73; STEINBERG, 
supra note 42, at 214 (discussing SEC Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with other 
nations). These MOUs typically include not only understandings on the rendering of 
information assistance but also obligations concerning confidentiality and permissible uses 
of information so obtained. Id. Technical assistance by the SEC may also be 
contemplated. See id. at 231. 
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offer regulation that issuers and investors want.61 Harmonization would 
simply create an international “regulatory cartel,”62 susceptible to the 
same inefficiencies that plague territorial regulatory monopolies. 
In any event, competition and harmonization offer two opposing 
alternatives to the unadorned application of national regulation to 
international transactions. 
 
B. Issuer Choice 
 
The conflicts problems described above argue for some global 
approach to securities regulation. According to its proponents, issuer 
choice offers a regulatory structure that is both global in scope and 
efficient.63 Under the current territorially-based approach to securities 
regulation, each national regulatory agency enjoys something of a 
“monopoly” in terms of the regulation it chooses to supply within its 
jurisdiction. Issuers and investors wishing to transact are unavoidably 
bound by the national securities laws of the jurisdiction in which they are 
deemed to have transacted. This territorially determined choice of 
securities regulatory regime may not be optimal for the parties to any 
given transaction. Regulatory monopolists have insufficient incentive and 
insufficient information to be able to offer optimal regulation.64 The 
issuer choice solution is to untether national capital markets from their 
respective national regulatory regimes, thereby breaking the regulatory 
monopolies. Allowing issuers to choose their securities regulation forces 
regulators to compete to supply regulation that transacting parties want. 
The idea of issuer choice is in essence a spin-off from the U.S. 
corporate charter competition model made popular by Romano and 
others.  The basic rationale for issuer choice parallels the rationale behind 
U.S. corporate charter competition. Think of law as a product. 
Competition among suppliers results in products that better satisfy 
consumer preferences. As with state competition for corporate charters in 
the United States, the argument goes, competition among nations’ 






61. Moreover, commentators have suggested that attempts at regulatory 
harmonization are driven by national regulators’ desire to preserve their own authority 
from dissipation, as targets of regulation exit to less heavily regulated jurisdictions. See 
Colombatto & Macey, supra note 59, at 955. 
62. Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 390. 
63. See id. at 392-97; Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 916-17. 
64. See Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 390-96. 
65. See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text. 
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The issuer choice approach solves the conflicts problem as well, 
according to proponents. It leaves the global choice of law to each firm to 
decide. Because the firm’s choice applies worldwide, conflicts do not 
arise. The issuer choice promise, then, is not only for efficient regulation 
but for efficient regulation on a global scale.66 
 
1. ROMANO’S PROPOSAL 
 
Romano’s initial issuer choice proposal focused primarily on U.S. 
issuers in the U.S. securities market.67 She advocated that federal 
regulation be optional, that U.S. states be allowed to offer competing 
securities regulatory regimes, and that firms be allowed to choose from 
among them. Firms could declare their choice of regime in their 
corporate charters.68 Her proposal additionally included two investor 
protections. First, the firm’s chosen regulatory regime would have to be 
explicitly disclosed to investors.69 Second, the firm’s selected regime 
could be changed only with shareholder approval.70 
Romano has proposed to extend this approach internationally, 
arguing generally that issuers should be allowed unrestrained choice in 
terms of a regulatory regime.71 Romano does enumerate basic disclosure 
requirements concerning the effects of international regime choice and the 
nature of an issuer’s selected regime.72 She suggests that disclosure 
specifically include notice that an investor’s domestic civil and criminal 
liability rules would not necessarily apply to the investor’s transactions.73 
In addition, if a firm’s selected regime did not include fraud liability or 
financial disclosure requirements, or if the regime lacked the capacity to 
prosecute violations of such rules, those deficiencies should also be 




66. See  Choi  &  Guzman,  supra  note  11,  at  914-16;  Romano,  Need  for 
Competition, supra note 10, at 389. 
67. See Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 10, at 2361. 
68. Romano also considered the possibility that firms’ chosen securities law 
would follow from their choice of state of incorporation. However, she concluded that an 
independent choice of securities law most closely comports with a market approach. See 
id. at 2410. 
69. Brokers would be required to inform prospective securities purchasers at the 
time of purchase; issuers would be required to disclose in writing at the time of any public 
offering; and the applicable regulation would have to be indicated on the security itself. 
See id. at 2413. 
70. See id. at 2415. 
71. Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 390. 
72. Id. at 401. 
73. Id. at 401-02. 
74. Id. 
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of shareholder approval for regime changes.75  Finally,  Romano 
anticipates that issuers, desiring to give international investors some 
assurance as to issuers’ amenability to suit, would consent to suit in 
appropriate fora in their offering and listing documents.76 Each nation’s 
judiciary should therefore be instructed to respect these forum selection 
clauses.77 
 
2. “PORTABLE RECIPROCITY” OF CHOI & GUZMAN 
 
Choi and Guzman conceptualize their proposal—“portable 
reciprocity”—as a simple extension of existing bilateral recognition 
agreements. Under the typical recognition or “passport” agreement, two 
countries agree that a party from one country need only comply with its 
home country regulation in order to be able to transact in the other “host” 
country. Each party’s home country regulation in effect “travels” with it 
for purposes of transacting in the host country.78 For example, the United 
States and Canada have agreed to a Multijurisdictional Disclosure System 
(MJDS), which basically permits a firm from either country to rely on its 
home country disclosure documents when issuing securities in the other 
country.79 
Portable reciprocity extends this basic approach. Choi and Guzman 
envision a regime of multilateral reciprocity, but instead of issuers being 
able merely to travel with their home country rules, every issuer would be 
permitted to choose the securities regulatory regime of any participating 
country. The choice of regime would be recognized for the issuer’s 
securities offered or traded in each participating country, regardless of the 
nationality or domicile of the issuer or investor or the location of any 





75. Id at 401. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. See Frederick Tung, Passports, Private Choice, and Private Interests: 
Regulatory Competition and Cooperation in Corporate, Securities, and Bankruptcy Law, 
3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 369 (2002) (discussing passport arrangements). Choi & Guzman refer to 
these arrangements as “normal” reciprocity. Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 918 & 
n.60. 
79. See Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current 
Registration and Reporting System for Canadian Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 6902, 
Exchange Act Release No. 29,354, Trust Indenture Act Release No. 2267, 56 Fed. Reg. 
30,036 (July 1, 1991); Notice of National Policy Statement No. 45, 14 OSC Bull. 2844 
(1991); see also Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 918 (describing MJDS); Tung, supra 
note 78, at 378-79 (same). 
80. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 922. 
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importance  of  disclosing  to  investors  the  firm’s  chosen  regulatory 
regime.81 
 
3. ASSUMED INCENTIVES OF REGULATORS 
 
Central to issuer choice proposals are the assumed incentives and 
motivations of national regulators. According to these proposals, 
bureaucracies thrive by expanding their reach, and in the case of securities 
regulation, the number and size of firms being regulated, and the volume 
of securities offerings and trading, are regulators’ maximands.82 Under 
regulatory monopoly, regulators are too easily tempted to pursue their 
own bureaucratic aggrandizement without regard for the public interest.83 
Romano cites as one example the SEC’s repeated attempts to expand its 
jurisdiction to include equity derivatives.84 By contrast, issuer choice 
would force national regulatory regimes to compete with one another to 
offer efficient regulatory “products”—those that would be popular with 
issuers and investors. Competition, the argument goes, would effectively 
harness regulators’ temptations toward bureaucratic aggrandizement in 
the service of more efficient regulation. Regulators would be responsive 
to the desires of issuers and investors because that would be their only 
available avenue for augmenting their regulatory purview. Regulators 
would aggressively push their products in order to expand their regulatory 
authority and augment the importance of their agencies. They might also 
charge fees for the use of their regulatory apparatus, thereby benefiting 
the national fisc. 
Besides the pursuit of direct bureaucratic benefits under issuer 
choice, regulators might also wish to benefit important constituents in 
order to obtain political support. Offering popular regulation would serve 
that end as well. Because issuers choosing a country’s regime would also 
likely offer their securities in that jurisdiction, successful sales of 
regulation would result in an increase in the volume of securities sold and 




81. See id. at 926. 
82. “[R]egulators prefer to have within their jurisdiction more rather than fewer 
regulated firms and transactions . . .”  Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 
393   (citing   WILLIAM    A.   NISKANEN,   JR.,   BUREAUCRACY    AND    REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 38-41 (1971)). 
83. Niskanen argues that the rational bureaucrat will seek to maximize her 
bureau’s budget, even a bureaucrat motivated to pursue the public interest. See NISKANEN, 
supra note 82, at 38. 
84. See Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 399. 
85. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 923. Issuers recognize that local 
investors are likely to be most familiar with local regulation and most comfortable with 
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benefit of both regulators and their important constituent, the national 
securities industry. In addition, it would also increase the range of readily 
available investment options for each nation’s investors.86 Moreover, the 
successful establishment or expansion of a local financial center creates 
jobs and generates tax revenues, further enhancing the prestige of the 
regulators who oversee the industry.87 The current system, which ties 
access to  domestic  capital markets to  compliance  with domestic 
regulation, impedes capital flows. Issuer choice would allow issuers to 
sell securities in each national jurisdiction without having to pay what is 
effectively an “entry fee” in the form of national regulatory compliance. 
 
4. OTHER REFINEMENTS 
 
Besides appropriate incentives, an issuer choice regime would also 
provide regulators with good information with which to design desirable 
regulation. Individual decisions of issuers in choosing their regulatory 
regimes would provide “market” information to regulators, who could 
respond to their consumers by altering their regulatory products to 
maximize adoptions. “[T]here will be a net flow of capital to firms 
operating under the regimes investors prefer and, hence, a feedback 
mechanism for regulators to ascertain which rules are cost effective.”88 
By contrast, under the current territorial system, national regulators not 
subject to competitive pressures do not have good information with which 
to craft optimal rules.89 
Issuer choice proponents are also confident that firm managers could 
not use their regulatory choices to investors’ disadvantage. Efficient 
capital markets can “price” the regulatory regimes selected, thereby 
precluding managers from pursuing their own interests at the expense of 
investors.90      For managers choosing regimes that provide insufficient 
 
 
local enforcement mechanisms.   Therefore, choosing local law is likely to enhance the 
popularity of any particular offering among local investors. See id. 
86. See id. at 922. 
87. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International 
Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1855, 1861 (1997). 
88. Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 390. 
89. See id. For international bureaucracies attempting to negotiate uniform rules, 
but not subject even to democratic accountability, the incentive and information problems 
are even worse. See Paul B. Stephan, Regulatory Cooperation and Competition: The 
Search for Virtue, in U. VA. SCH. LAW, LEGAL STUDIES WORKING PAPERS SERIES 99-12 
(June 1999). 
90. Romano notes: 
In today's global financial markets, which are dominated by sophisticated 
institutional investors, competition among securities regulators would not only 
protect investors, both large and small, but also would provide a superior 
regulatory regime. . . . In competitive capital markets, issuers of securities 
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investor protections—for example, a regime may allow managerial 
opportunism—their firms would suffer in the capital markets. Investors 
would pay less for the securities of those issuers than if a more investor- 
protective regime had been selected.91 Because a firm’s managers desire 
to minimize the firm’s costs of capital and maximize offering proceeds 
and post-offer trading values, they would, given the choice, select the 
regulatory regime that is optimal for the firm’s investors. 
Where Romano and Choi and Guzman tend to differ is in the 
direction they believe the competition will lead.  Romano believes that 
securities regulation will race to the top. For Romano, the starting point 
for issuer choice in securities regulation is the declared triumph of U.S. 
corporate charter competition. Free choice of firms’ states of 
incorporation and facilitative conflicts rules create a national market for 
corporate law, in which states are producers competing for consumers of 
corporate law. According to Romano, this competition produces 
corporate law that maximizes firm values and investors’ returns.92 
Additionally, the same dynamics that have driven this race to the top can 
be harnessed to produce optimal securities regulation. In her view, 
competition over securities regulation will similarly cause regulatory 
regimes to converge around the rules that issuers and investors want.93 
Choi and Guzman are less convinced about convergence and 
agnostic as to its direction. Instead, they posit the heterogeneity of issuers 
and investors. Not all issuers are alike, so a regulatory regime that is 
suitable for one may not be desirable to another. In their view, the beauty 
 
 
have incentives to select regulatory regimes that protect investors from 
exploitation by insiders, because such choices lower the cost of capital. Even 
though individual investors may be poorly informed regarding what level of 
disclosure or other protective mechanisms are necessary, because the 
distribution of equity returns is pro-rated by share ownership and there is one 
price for shares, informed institutional investors dictate the regulatory choices 
of issuers and less-informed investors are thereby also protected. 
Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 389; see also Romano, Empowering 
Investors, supra note 10, at 2366-67. Choi has acknowledged that not all firms’ securities 
trade in efficient markets. Responding to issuer choice critics, Choi proposes the 
partitioning of markets in order to allow issuer choice to apply to that part of the market in 
which it is most likely to function best. He would limit issuer choice to (i) “efficient 
market” companies—those for which securities markets can accurately price regulatory 
choices—and (ii) non-efficient market companies that agree to allow only sophisticated 
investors to hold their securities. See Choi, supra note 17, at 818-19. 
91. See Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 10, at 2366-67; Romano, 
Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 493. 
92. Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 494. 
93. See Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 10, at 2387. More recently, 
Romano has considered the possibility that regulatory diversity would result, which would 
stand to benefit heterogeneous issuers. See Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, 
at 395-96. 
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of competition is that it generates regulatory diversity, allowing firms to 
choose from an array of regulatory options, and allowing investors a 
choice as to the regulatory regimes under which they will invest.94 In this 
way, heterogeneous issuers and investors are more likely to be matched, 
thereby eliminating the deadweight losses associated with territorially 
imposed regulation. 
 
C. Who Will Supply Choice of Law Rules? 
 
To date, the debate over issuer choice has focused primarily on the 
demand side—the behavior of firm managers and investors—and 
whether issuer choice will work as predicted. Merritt Fox and Roberta 
Romano have debated whether the existence of interfirm externalities 
from corporate disclosure preclude firm managers from making socially 
optimal regime choices.95 Jim Cox has expressed doubt that securities 
markets can efficiently price differences among regulatory regimes.96 
Echoing the debate over U.S. corporate charter competition,97 Romano 
predicts a race to the top from issuer choice of securities regulation, while 
Fox and Cox each predict a race to the bottom—that is, competition will 
produce socially undesirable laws. And Choi and Guzman predict a 
separating equilibrium, asserting that heterogeneity of issuers will result 
in different jurisdictions offering different regulatory regimes to meet 




94. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 917. 
95. According to Fox, even absent agency problems, interfirm externalities cause 
a divergence between a firm’s private marginal cost of disclosure and social marginal cost. 
Because private cost will be higher than social cost at all levels of disclosure, managers 
given a choice of disclosure regime will always choose a socially suboptimal level of 
disclosure. Romano disputes these assertions, arguing among other things that the 
presence of institutional investors internalizes any interfirm externalities. Compare Fox, 
Political Economy, supra note 19,  at 749, and Fox,  Retaining Mandatory Securities 
Disclosure, supra note 19, at 1345, and Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate, supra note 19, 
with Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10. Fox also argues that including public 
choice considerations in the analysis shows that an international race to the bottom may 
result. See Fox, Political Economy, supra note 19, at 793. He proposes his own novel 
allocation of regulatory jurisdiction, arguing that it should be based on issuer nationality. 
A country should regulate only its domestic issuers, those whose “economic center of 
gravity” is located there. See Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing 
Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2506 (1997). 
96. See Cox, supra note 20, at 1234. 
97. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 
(1993) (arguing that competition for corporate charters among U.S. states has resulted in 
more efficient corporate law overall); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: 
Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974) (asserting that result of 
corporate charter competition has been a “race for the bottom”). 
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The supply side of issuer choice, however—the story of how 
regulators and other government suppliers of law behave—has not been 
much questioned.98 For issuer choice proponents, both the diagnosis of 
the disease of regulatory “monopoly” and its antidote rely on standard 
public choice assumptions—that regulators regulate in order to garner 
rents for themselves and favored constituencies.99 Under regulatory 
monopoly, the analysis goes, regulators have insufficient incentive to be 
responsive to the needs of issuers and investors. Once forced to compete, 
however, regulators’ survival and their ability to benefit important 
constituents will depend on designing efficient products—i.e., rules that 
issuers and investors want. 
A basic question exists, however, concerning the international 
framework for competition. Incentives to supply socially optimal 
regulation would operate according to issuer choice predictions only if 
regulators truly competed in a well-functioning market for securities law. 
But they don’t. Analysts on all sides have focused on substantive rules 
and the dynamics of competition over those rules.100 But they have 
ignored the  fact that competition over substantive rules requires 
international cooperation in structuring the market in which states would 
compete.101 In fact, the political actors that would in theory compete over 
substantive securities law under issuer choice—regulators and other law 
givers—are also the ones whose cooperation and support would be 
required to create the market at the outset. 
Regulators or other law givers would have to agree to a choice of law 
rule honoring firms’ private choice. Each state would have to give up its 
traditional territorial jurisdiction for its securities law, and agree instead to 
apply whatever law a firm might choose. Issuer choice proponents have 





98. As such, issuer choice is of a piece with the competitive federalism literature 
that relies on “efficiency-driven, demand-side arguments that assume away politics and 
institutions . . . . Missing from the . . . literature is a treatment of the institutional supply 
side.” Jonathan Rodden & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Preserve Markets?, 
83 VA. L. REV. 1521, 1532 (1997). 
99. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text. 
100. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. 
101. “[T]he formal prerequisite of a cooperative approach to regulatory 
competition is the existence of a consensus about either the enforceability of explicit 
choices of law or the content of choice-of-law rules that turn on transactional forms that 
parties can manipulate.” Stephan, supra note 89, at 12. Moreover, stable equilibria 
cannot occur without some sort of centralized institutional framework to facilitate 
competition.  See Joel P. Trachtman, Regulatory Competition and Regulatory Jurisdiction 
in International Securities Regulation, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION 289, 294 (Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001). 
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will have sufficient incentive to supply the right choice of law rules.  The 
market just exists.102 
Because the requisite choice of law rules for international issuer 
choice do not exist, nations would have to supply it.103 Analysts of 
regulatory competition do not typically think of this as a problem of 
supply. Working from the model of U.S. federalism, the framework for 
competition is already in place. Therefore, the rules needed to create it 
are not regarded as part of the product states offer. But with the move 
from U.S. federalism to international competition, the nature of the 
product must change in this fundamental way to include facilitative 
choice of law rules. 
What incentives would regulators have to supply this critical 
element? Ironically, the very incentives that would theoretically drive 
regulators to vigorous competition on substantive regulation—assuming 
an international framework for competition already existed—would likely 
also drive them to resist competition in the first place. If all the world’s 
securities regulators could agree to respect firms’ private choice, then the 
pursuit of bureaucratic aggrandizement might cause each regulator to 
respond to consumer preferences in order to maximize the number of 
firms under her regulatory authority. But even if that were true, it would 
not explain why regulators would willingly surrender their regulatory 
monopolies in the first place. Why would a monopolist—regulatory or 
otherwise—prefer competition to a cozy monopoly? For the regulatory 
monopolist intent on the pursuit of bureaucratic aggrandizement, giving 
up the monopoly in favor of competition would seem an odd way to 
 
 
102. Choi and Guzman merely posit international agreements implementing the 
appropriate choice-of-law rules. Likewise, Romano simply assumes national actors— 
executives and legislatures—in each jurisdiction would sign the right treaties to require 
states to respect private choice of foreign securities law. “Mutual recognition of statutory 
securities domicile would . . . have to be effectuated by a treaty or other executive 
agreement . . . . This undoubtedly  complicates the implementation of a competitive 
international regime.” Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 398. Romano 
recognizes the theoretical possibility that the SEC could exercise its exemptive powers to 
create competition. See id. Alan Palmiter has made the same suggestion. See Alan R. 
Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1. 
However, given Romano’s assumptions about SEC incentives, she justifiably doubts that 
it would do so. She ultimately recognizes that some form of legislative or executive action 
would be necessary to create a competitive regime. See Romano, Need for Competition, 
supra note 10, at 398. Despite this bifurcation of regulatory versus national officials, it 
remains a supply problem, albeit involving different officials that also have significant 
influence over the texture of securities law. And no theory has addressed this problem. 
103. “Within the U.S. federal system, stability is provided by the ability of the 
federal government to intercede; this is an important distinction between regulatory 
competition in the U.S. domestic context and regulatory competition in the international 
context. In the international context, we must build and empower a central authority.” 
Trachtman, supra note 101, at 295. 
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proceed. Surely a move from monopoly to competition can only threaten 
the assumed goals of the maximizing bureaucrat. As I explain below, the 
maximizing bureaucrat’s more likely strategy is to pursue regulatory price 
discrimination like a good monopolist. 
Once we acknowledge that the emergence of appropriate choice of 
law rules cannot simply be treated as exogenous, but must be endogenous 
to our model, then providing a consistent description of regulators’ 
incentives that results in the emergence of both an international 
framework for competition and competition over substantive rules 
becomes quite tricky. Whether such a story can be told is doubtful. 
To be sure, regulators—as distinct from legislators and executive 
officials—may not necessarily enjoy a veto power over these choice of 
law rules and whether a competitive system is realized. In all likelihood, 
legislative and executive action would be required to achieve the 
necessary international cooperation in any event.104 However, regulators 
not only design substantive rules; they may also have significant influence 
over the jurisdictional scope of their substantive law products.105 
Regulators’ opposition to issuer choice would surely make 
implementation more difficult politically.106 Moreover, recognizing the 
necessity of legislative and executive action simply moves the question to 
a higher level. Under what circumstances would national officials be 
willing to supply the right choice of law rules for regulatory competition? 
In Parts II and III of this Article, I discuss these questions about the 
incentives and constraints of regulators and other lawmakers with respect 
to issuer choice. Before proceeding to those analyses, I briefly discuss 
corporate charter competition in the United States and the choice of law 
rule that emerged among U.S. states to facilitate it. I suggest important 
conditions that led to its emergence, and I distinguish those conditions 
from the current international setting for securities regulation. As earlier 
noted, the model of U.S. corporate charter competition figures 
prominently in the affirmative case made for issuer choice.  However, the 
U.S. and international settings are different in important respects. That 
facilitative choice of law rules could emerge among U.S. states thus 








104. See Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 399-400. 
105. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 13, at 209 (discussing SEC approaches to 
extraterritorial jurisdiction concerning securities offerings and antifraud rules). 
106. See infra Part III.A. 
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D. Corporate Charter Competition in the United States 
 
Under U.S. corporate charter competition, the internal affairs rule 
enables the competition that exists. While each state offers its own 
corporation law, states generally accept and apply the so-called internal 
affairs rule for their choice of law regarding a corporation’s internal 
affairs—the relations among a firm’s shareholders and managers.107 
Under this rule, the firm’s chosen corporation law will govern its internal 
affairs, regardless of the location of the firm’s headquarters, assets, or 
personnel, regardless of where particular transactions occur or particular 
persons reside.108 Therefore, a firm may incorporate under   the 
corporation law of any state, and its choice will be respected in other 
states. This common respect for firm choice effectively creates a 
common market for corporate law. States act as producers competing 
nationwide for consumers of corporate law. Because states may garner 
significant fees with successful sales of corporate charters, as well as 
benefit local constituents, they have some incentive to offer corporate law 
that firm managers and investors prefer. According to regulatory 
competition advocates, this competition among states produces corporate 
law that maximizes firm values and investors’ returns.109 
Moving to the international context, however, no mechanism like the 
internal affairs rule exists. That consensus could emerge among U.S. 
states regarding the internal affairs rule does not imply that a similar 
choice of law rule and competitive framework could spontaneously 
develop internationally for securities regulation. The background 
conditions are dissimilar. 
U.S. states are of course part of a federal system governed under the 
Constitution, and no similar institutional framework exists for 
independent nations. Scholars disagree as to the relative importance of 




107. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 302(2) (1971); MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT § 15.05(c) (1984). 
108. A handful of states—California and New York most notably—impose their 
own local requirements on certain foreign corporations as to certain issues. See CAL. 
CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1990 & Supp. 2002); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1317-1320 
(West 1986 & Supp. 2002). 
109. See ROMANO, supra note 97, at 14-51. Recent scholarship has questioned 
whether states actually do compete for charters. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf 
Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Debate on State 
Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553 (2002); Marcel Kahan & Ehud 
Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002). 
110. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Contract and Jurisdictional 
Freedom, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 325, 333 (F.H. Buckley ed., 
1999). 
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However, even on the most decentralized, bottom-up view of things—that 
each state unilaterally and independently arrived at the internal affairs 
rule—Constitutional guaranties of unimpeded interstate commerce played 
a critical role. According to this view, in the absence of state-by-state 
trade barriers, firms could generally avoid unattractive corporate law by 
simply relocating out of an unattractive jurisdiction, while continuing to 
sell products into the unfriendly jurisdiction.111 This relatively easy exit 
option meant that a state had little to gain and something to lose—in 
terms of local tax base, business opportunities, employment, and other 
positive spillovers—by attempting to impose local corporate law in the 
face of a firm’s election of another state’s law. Therefore, local interests 
in each state would have favored local recognition of out-of-state 
incorporation, supporting the internal affairs rule and precluding the 
formation of interest groups favoring territoriality in corporate law.112 On 
this view, put simply, the threat of firms’ physical exit to avoid a state’s 
undesirable corporate law forced each state to offer virtual exit— 
avoidance of the unattractive local law without the need for physical 
exit—through adoption of the internal affairs rule.113 
Historically, however, different conditions have obtained for firm 
mobility and securities law recognition in the international context. It 
should not surprise, therefore, that interest group alignments for securities 
law recognition among nations would have developed quite differently 
from the case of corporation law among U.S. states. Firms historically 
have not enjoyed nearly the physical mobility internationally that they 
enjoy within the United States. Their headquarters and key operations, 
employees, relationships, goodwill, and assets are not readily transplanted 
internationally without significant loss of value. Moreover, firms would 
typically have had difficulty avoiding application of their home country 
securities laws.   Because the costs of capital are likely to be lowest at 
 
 
111. Territorial application of local corporate law typically involves rules to 
protect local investors, and exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction is typically based on the 
predominance of firm assets, employees, sales, income, or investors in the prescribing 
jurisdiction. See supra note 108 and sources cited therein. 
112. See William J. Carney, The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate 
Charters, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 312 (1997); Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 110. 
Comparing the U.S. federal system with company law within the European Community 
(EC), Carney has detailed the link between the lack of competition among EC countries 
and interest group influences resulting in harmonization of interest group protections 
through EC company law directives. See Carney, supra, at 318. 
113. States’ other obvious alternative—reforming the unattractive aspects of their 
corporate laws—has apparently also been pursued. Scholars have noted the substantial 
uniformity across states’ corporate law statutes. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law 
Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 588 (1990); Roberta 
Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 225, 235 (1985). 
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home,114 firms issuing securities generally cannot avoid issuing in their 
home jurisdictions.115 It is this “hometown” effect that guaranties the 
regulatory monopolies that issuer choice proponents condemn. Bound to 
their home country securities markets, firms are likewise bound to home 
country securities law. Home country interests with economic stakes in 
preserving and promoting home country securities activity—for example, 
stock exchanges and investment banks—would not have felt threatened 
by the possibility of firm exit. Lawmakers would therefore not have felt 
any local pressure to offer virtual exit—in the form of issuer choice—to 
forestall firms’ physical exit. There would have been no push to forsake 
territorial securities law in deference to firms’ alternative choices. 
Instead, as I argue below, just the opposite has occurred. Within 
each independent nation, the operation of a national securities regulatory 
regime, combined with the historical difficulties of firms’ physical exit 
from their home jurisdictions, would not surprisingly produce important 
interest groups with stakes in territorial regulation.116 These interest 
groups—as well as regulators—will wish to preserve regulatory 
monopoly, making issuer choice unlikely.117 
 
II. REGULATORS’ CALCULUS 
 
Assuming that regulators were not public regarding but only 
rationally self-interested, it is far from clear that regulators in any country 




114. A firm’s capital costs are likely to be lowest in its home country because 
home country investors are likely to enjoy informational advantages over foreign investors 
with respect to assessing the firm’s value and prospects. See Fox, Political Economy, 
supra note 19, at 770-71 (“Despite the burden of compliance, avoiding the U.S. market 
traditionally has not made sense for U.S. issuers since the United States is the residence of 
a large portion of their most likely potential investors.”); Romano, supra note 10, at 2397 
(“[R]esort solely to foreign capital markets for financing is not a viable option for publicly 
traded U.S. firms.”). Under the EU’s “passport” system for securities listings and public 
offerings, a firm could choose a regulatory regime other than that of its home state by 
making its initial offering in another member state. But “[i]n reality, very few issuers 
apparently choose to list outside of their home country given that issuers often find the 
warmest reception for their securities in their home markets.” Jackson & Pan, supra note 
32, at 678-79 & n.70. 
115. For a discussion of the exceptional case of Israeli high-tech firms avoiding 
the Israeli securities market, see infra Part II.D. This exceptional situation would most 
typically involve firms from a country with a small and unattractive securities market, 
what I term a “regulatory price-taking” jurisdiction. See infra Part III.B. 
116. Not only do interest groups affect policies, but policies may also produce 
interest groups. See Paul Pierson, When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and 
Political Change, 45 WORLD POLITICS 595 (1993) (noting that “policies produce politics”). 
117. See infra Part III.B. 
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A regulator would accept issuer choice and abandon territorial choice of 
law rules only if she could be confident ex ante that her prospective 
private benefits under issuer choice—in terms of bureaucratic 
aggrandizement and the ability to favor important domestic interest 
groups—would exceed those under her existing monopoly.118 
A regulator enjoying a healthy monopoly would be unlikely to prefer 
the vagaries of competition under issuer choice. She would have to be 
extremely confident in the ability of her domestic regime to compete 
internationally in terms of selling her regulatory product.119 In addition, 
she would have to be amenable to the loss of political slack that would 
result from regulatory competition.120 Assuming a risk averse regulator 
further narrows the possibilities for choice of law arrangements leading to 
competition. 
On the other hand, against their druthers, some regulators might be 
forced to compete. As with any monopoly, a regulator’s market power 
may be dissipated by technological or other innovations. With securities 
transactions, the increased mobility of issuers and investors may enable 
their figurative exit from particular jurisdictions with unattractive 
regulatory or other characteristics. Traditionally, issuers and investors 
transacted primarily or exclusively in their home jurisdictions, where they 
were most familiar with the overall business and investment climate— 
law, custom, language, culture, currency, and the like. Israeli firms issued 
their securities in Israel; Japanese investors bought securities of Japanese 
issuers in Japan.121   However, especially for countries with small, illiquid 
 
 
118. As for social benefits, playing issuer choice might be a positive-sum game 
globally. As issuer choice proponents argue, marginal issuers that might not be willing or 
able to issue securities under a territorially-based system might be able to find a desirable 
regulatory regime under issuer choice, such that increased issuing and trading volumes 
would result. And investors would benefit from expanded investment opportunities. 
However, according to our public choice assumptions, territorially-based regulators care 
only about their private benefits, so a regulator would be unmoved by appeals to social 
benefits. She would support issuer choice only if she could be confident it would augment 
her private benefits. 
119. Regulators may in addition embrace inertia for behavioral reasons. Loss 
aversion from regret avoidance may cause individuals unduly to favor the status quo. See 
Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological 
Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1998). Regulators are 
not immune from this status quo bias. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: 
A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1056 (2000) (pointing out that regulators 
must be “endogenized” in any analysis seeking to rely on law to correct bias-induced 
market failures). But organizations may to some extent perform a “debiasing” role. See 
Chip Heath et al., Cognitive Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can Compensate for 
Individual Shortcomings, 20 RES. IN ORG’L BEHAV. 1 (1998). 
120. Cf. Levine & Forrence, infra note 187 (discussing political slack that allows 
regulators to favor private interests). 
121. See supra note 114. 
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securities markets, the increasing mobility of local issuers and investors 
may enable them to find acceptable substitutes outside their home 
jurisdictions. A regulator in such a jurisdiction may be forced to compete 
to some extent as her market power wanes. 
In this Part, I examine the incentives of regulators to bring about the 
envisioned international issuer choice regime. In particular, I discuss 
regulators’ incentives with respect to choice of law rules, the structuring 
of which could either facilitate or impede regulatory competition. 
Adopting the assumptions of issuer choice proponents regarding 
regulators’ incentives,122 I not only show that regulators would oppose 
adoption of rules recognizing private choice—a prospect that issuer 
choice advocates have already noted123—but I also describe their optimal 
strategies in pursuing their assumed maximands. Treating regulation as a 
“price” that regulators charge for access to their national capital markets, I 
discuss the differing strategies of regulators from “price-setting” and 
“price-taking” jurisdictions. In particular, regulators in price-setting 
jurisdictions will adopt a strategy of regulatory price discrimination, a 
strategy inconsistent with issuer choice. 
 
A. Regulatory Monopoly and Regulation as Price 
 
Because territorially-based securities regulation ties capital markets 
to national regulatory regimes, we can think of regulation as a “price” that 
a national regulator charges issuers in order to have their securities issued 
and traded in the national market.124 For each issuer, we may assume that 
an optimal set of securities regulations exists that maximizes firm 
value.125 Call that the issuer’s “regulatory ideal.”126 To the extent that a 
nation’s actual regulatory regime diverges from an issuer’s regulatory 
ideal,  the  regulation  is  by  definition  value-decreasing.    It  effectively 
 
 
122. The supposition that lawmakers would be sufficiently motivated to compete 
has not gone uncontested. See Douglas J. Cumming & Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, The Role of 
Interjurisdictional Competition in Shaping Canadian Corporate Law, 20 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 141 (2000); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism 
Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594, 605-06 (1980); see also supra note 109 
and sources cited therein. 
123. See Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 399. 
124. Cf. Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1525 
(1984) (defining a price as a payment of money that is required in order to do what is 
permitted). 
125. This definition assumes away the possibility of agency costs that could 
preclude an issuer from desiring value-maximizing law. Cf. Choi & Guzman, supra note 
87, at 1864 (defining regulatory ideal within a country as the regulation issuers and 
investors within the country would choose if they could costlessly contract). 
126. Whether the regulatory ideals for various issuers converge or diverge does 
not matter for our purposes. 
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exacts a price from the issuer for the privilege of engaging in securities 
activities within the jurisdiction. 
As so described, a “high” price would not necessarily reflect 
overregulation, but a large difference between the regulatory ideal and the 
actual regulation. A regime that is too lax might therefore exact a high 
regulatory price, as well as a regime that is too stringent. Remaining true 
to our assumptions about regulators’ incentives, however, issuer choice 
advocates generally assume that the degree of actual regulation—at least 
in important jurisdictions—exceeds the regulatory ideal.127 Pursuit of 
bureaucratic aggrandizement causes regulators to err on the side of 
overregulation, not under regulation. For present purposes, we may adopt 
this perspective and assume that regulators will attempt to charge as high 
a price as possible on the side of overregulation.128 
Treating national regulation as the price of entry into a national 
securities market, we may further observe that national markets are not all 
equally attractive. Some are more attractive than others, and this will 
affect their regulatory pricing strategies. Although each national regulator 
probably enjoys some degree of market power, primarily with respect to 
local issuers and investors, improved investor and issuer mobility may 
diminish regulators’ market power even as to these traditionally captured 
consumers. Especially for issuers  and investors from countries with 
small, illiquid national markets, modern telecommunications and other 
technological innovations may offer access to more intrinsically attractive 
capital markets. As acceptable substitutes for the local securities market 
become available, the national regulator’s market power diminishes and 
her regulatory monopoly becomes contested. Suboptimal regulation may 
drive issuers and investors to figuratively exit their home jurisdictions— 
issuers by offering and listing their securities in other national markets, 
and investors by transacting in foreign exchanges or other offshore 
markets. Jurisdictions that find their regulatory monopolies threatened in 
this way may have to adjust their regulatory pricing in response to market 
 
 
127. For example, Romano has repeatedly questioned the need for the SEC’s 
mandatory disclosure regime. See ROMANO, supra note 97, at 93; Romano, Empowering 
Investors, supra note 10, at 2373; Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 465. 
Likewise, Choi & Guzman doubt the promise of international cooperation in securities 
regulation because of concerns that national regulators might “take over” international 
agreements, “adding provisions and increasing the complexity of the regime to enhance 
the importance of the regulatory agencies.” Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 915-16. 
128. The ability to charge an infinitely high price will be constrained not only by 
market forces but also by politics. Issuers’ costs of political action—for example, resort to 
legislative relief from overregulation by the bureaucracy—become relatively more 
attractive as regulatory pricing increases. So both exit and voice will serve to constrain 
regulatory pricing. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: 
RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
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pressures. These jurisdictions may usefully be characterized as regulatory 
“price-taking” jurisdictions.129 
By contrast, for national markets without close substitutes—such as 
the U.S. market—the national regulator will continue to enjoy a healthy 
degree of market power. These we may characterize as regulatory “price- 
setting” jurisdictions. These jurisdictions have sufficiently attractive 
capital markets that they can attract issuers and investors without 
necessarily also having to offer a particularly attractive regulatory regime. 
Their attractive capital markets allow them some market power. They are 
not subject to severe competitive pressure in terms of their regulatory 
pricing. Price-taking jurisdictions, on the other hand, run much greater 
risks that unattractive regulatory burdens will drive issuers away from 
their national markets to others offering more attractive pricing.130 I first 
discuss the United States as an exemplar of price-setting jurisdictions. 
Price-taking jurisdictions are discussed below in Part II.D. 
 
B. Regulatory Monopoly and Regulatory Price Discrimination 
 
The size and depth of the U.S. capital market enable the United 
States to attract issuers and investors, even if the U.S. regulatory regime is 
suboptimal—that is, even if the regulatory price is set too high. 
According to issuer choice proponents, regulators therefore have 
insufficient incentive to adopt more efficient regulations—which in effect 
would lower the price.131 But this is exactly the reason U.S. regulators 
will oppose competition and the choice of law rules required to bring it 
about. As a regulatory price-setting jurisdiction, the United States does 
not necessarily need to “win”—or even compete—in any international 
competition. Its bread-and-butter clientele—made up of U.S. issuers and 
investors—is largely captive.132 
 
 
129. See Amir N. Licht, David’s Dilemma: A Case Study of Securities Regulation 
in a Small Open Market, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 673 (2001). Adjustments to 
regulation may not be the only tool available to these jurisdictions. Competition to attract 
securities activity may take whatever form is useful for making the national securities 
market more appealing to issuers. Indirect subsidies to local underwriters, for example, 
might facilitate and encourage local offerings. 
130. Most countries in the world fall into this latter category. These typologies of 
price setters and price takers are crude, of course, but distinguishing them bluntly enables 
us also to distinguish clearly the different incentives and constraints at work. 
131. Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 919. 
132. “Despite the burden of compliance, avoiding the U.S. market traditionally 
has not made sense for U.S. issuers since the United States is the residence of a large 
portion of their most likely potential investors.” Fox, Political Economy, supra note 19, at 
770-71. Of course, if the price is exorbitant, that simply makes other  alternatives 
relatively more attractive. For example, private placements or overseas offerings are 
always options, and in any event, both are likely to become more attractive over time. 
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The sources of attraction of the U.S. securities market are well 
known. It is the largest, deepest, and most liquid market in the world, 
providing issuers with the largest national pool of investors.133 Having 
shares sold and traded in the U.S. market offers increased prestige and 
visibility for any issuer—for its securities and possibly for its products as 
well. For U.S. issuers especially, the U.S. market is likely to be the most 
attractive. Besides its sheer size and liquidity, the pool of U.S. investors 
is likely to be the cheapest source of capital for U.S. issuers, as domestic 
investors enjoy lower information and transaction costs than their foreign 
counterparts. U.S. issuers and investors share common understandings 
about the business and investment environment in the United States, as do 
local issuers and investors in most nations. They share a common 
language and culture. U.S. investors have natural advantages over foreign 
investors in terms of accessing and analyzing information about U.S. 
issuers. U.S. investors and their information intermediaries have better 
access to corporate executives and  other informed sources than their 
foreign counterparts.134 Because of these advantages, all else equal, U.S. 
investors will generally be willing and able to outbid foreign investors for 
their stakes in U.S. firms. In addition, because the most convenient 
market for U.S. investors is the domestic market, U.S. issuers will wish to 
be there as well. U.S. issuers will naturally prefer the U.S. market to 
others. Their demand for access to the U.S. securities market, then, is 
inelastic. They have no close substitute, so the SEC enjoys market power 
as to them.135 “[R]esort solely to foreign capital markets for financing is 
not a viable option for publicly traded U.S. firms.”136 
In addition, the large and liquid market will attract noncaptive issuers 
as well. Many of the advantages described above apply  for foreign 
issuers as well. Whether U.S. securities laws are optimal or not, many 
foreign firms will still wish to issue their securities in the U.S. market. 
Moreover, given the assumed incentives of regulators to expand the 
jurisdictional reach of national securities laws and to maximize the 
number of firms and transactions within their regulatory purview, the 




133. U.S. exchanges also provide superior order execution.   See Amar Bhide, 
Efficient Markets, Deficient Governance, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 128-29. 
134. Foreign investors can and certainly do hire U.S. information intermediaries. 
However, all  else equal, U.S.  investors will also have better  information on quality 
differences among U.S. intermediaries. See generally Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors 
Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REV. 279, 290-96 (2000) (discussing 
benefits and risks of relying on information intermediaries). 
135. This will likely remain true at least for the medium term. However, given 
the increasing mobility of both investors and issuers, all predictions must be tentative. 
136. Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 10, at 2397. 
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monopoly it already has over domestic issuers,137 while also attempting to 
attract new business from those marginal issuers otherwise outside the 
reach of the monopoly—that is, foreign issuers. The foreign issuer is the 
marginal issuer with price sensitivity, so the SEC has incentive to 
accommodate the foreign issuer on pricing. The domestic issuer is much 
less price sensitive and so will not receive the same accommodation. 
Differential pricing makes sense because it enables the regulator to 
increase the number of firms under its regulatory purview, which serves 
its goal of bureaucratic aggrandizement. Many foreign issuers may be 
unwilling to pay the regulatory price charged to U.S. issuers for access to 
the U.S. securities market. Without the same “hometown” attachment to 
the U.S. market that affects U.S. firms, foreign issuers naturally have 
other ready  alternatives for  their  capital  raising. Because of  foreign 
issuers’ higher elasticity of demand for access to the U.S. market, the 
maximizing regulator should charge them a lower price than that charged 
to domestic issuers.138 The regulator will price discriminate among 
consumers.139 Below I first explain the general conditions for price 
discrimination, and then describe price discrimination in U.S. securities 
regulation. 
 
1. CONDITIONS FOR PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
 
According to its standard economic definition, price discrimination is 
a strategy of nonuniform pricing through which firms with market power 
maximize profits.140 Translating into the regulatory realm, access to the 
national securities market is the “product,” which the issuer purchases 
from the regulator by paying the specified regulatory price. We might say 






137. As critics of issuer choice have observed, however, even under regulatory 
“monopoly,” issuers have choices. See John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of 
Securities Regulation: A Political Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 531, 549-53 
(2001). 
138. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 137 (1988). 
139. Romano observes, for instance, that while the SEC is willing to lower 
disclosure requirements for foreign issuers in order to attract their listings to the U.S. 
market, it has consistently increased the disclosure requirements for domestic issuers. See 
Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 399.  Niskanen noted the possibility that 
certain bureaucracies would be able to price discriminate among customers. See 
NISKANEN, supra note 82, at 34. See generally DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. 
PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 287 (3d. ed. 1999) (discussing price 
discrimination); TIROLE, supra note 138, at 133-52 (same). 
140. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 139, at 274. 
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“output”—allowing  one  more  issuer  to  access  the  national  capital 
market—while pricing above marginal cost for this access.141 
In general, the strategy is only available if three conditions are met. 
First, the seller—in this case, the regulator as the seller of access to its 
domestic securities market—must enjoy some market power. Otherwise, 
any attempt to charge consumers more than a competitive price would 
fail.142 Second, the seller must know or be able to infer consumers’ 
willingness to pay for each unit of the good or service at issue. In other 
words, the seller must be able to identify the consumers willing to pay the 
higher price.143 And finally, conditions must be such that arbitrage is 
precluded. That is, purchasers paying the lower price should not be able 
to resell the product. Otherwise, those paying the lower price could resell 
to the high-price purchasers, creating competition for the seller, driving 
down the price toward the nondiscriminatory monopoly price, and 
frustrating the seller’s attempt to discriminate.144 
Each of these conditions obtains for the SEC and regulators in other 
price-setting jurisdictions. First, as a regulator in a price-setting 
jurisdiction, the SEC by definition enjoys market power. Second, as for 
distinguishing among consumers, grouping firms into “domestic” and 
“foreign” serves as a useful proxy for those with low and high elasticities 
of demand. Securities regulators generally have no difficulty 
distinguishing domestic issuers from foreign. Even multinational firms 
typically have an identifiable “center of gravity,” based on the location of 
their headquarters, the nationality of their executive officers and other 
employees, the location of their principal assets, and the like.145 The SEC 
definition of “foreign private issuer,” for example, relies on these factors 




141. Cf. id. (explaining incentives for price discrimination). Marginal cost may 
be an elusive concept in this context, as the regulator does not actually make the product. 
On the other hand, the character of the national market is undoubtedly shaped in some 
measure by the applicable securities regulation, such that the regulation itself can be 
considered an integral part of the product. And supplying the regulation and enforcing it 
as to each issuer does have costs. From that perspective, it would seem that the marginal 
cost of supplying the product to a foreign issuer is at least as high as for a domestic issuer, 
so that a lower regulatory price for foreign issuers could not be explained on the basis of 
lower marginal costs. Instead, reducing the price for the foreign issuer would seem a 
useful strategy for maximizing bureaucratic profits, provided the price still exceeds 
marginal cost. 
142. Absent some market power, a producer faces a perfectly flat demand curve. 
In a perfectly competitive market, a producer that tries to charge more than the market 
price for its product loses all its customers to its competitors. Id. 
143. See id. 
144. Id. 
145. See Fox, Political Economy, supra note 19, at 733. 
1398 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
 
 
more lenient regulatory treatment in the United States.146  Moreover, even 
if some doubt existed as to the firm’s “nationality,” there would likely be 
only two contending alternatives. Regulators will not have difficulty 
identifying high price and low price consumers.147 
Finally, as for the possibility of arbitrage, it is unlikely that a foreign 
firm would be able somehow to transfer its preferential access or foreign 
status to a domestic firm for purposes of selling securities in the domestic 
market. Securities regulators’ careful selection of criteria for 
distinguishing foreign from domestic firms would preclude a foreign firm 
from “fronting” for a domestic firm. 
 
2. PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
As the preceding discussion would predict, for several decades, the 
SEC through its rulemaking authority has reduced disclosure and other 
regulatory requirements for foreign issuers in the U.S. market as 
compared to their U.S. counterparts.148 Perhaps no single theory of 
regulatory behavior provides a complete explanation for this trend, but a 
public choice/price discrimination story is plausible. 
Foreign issuers—that is, those qualifying as “foreign private 
issuers”149—enjoy more relaxed requirements when it comes to offering 
their securities in the U.S. In a public offering, for example, their 
disclosure obligations concerning management compensation, material 




146. See infra Part II.B.2. Any corporation incorporated or organized under the 
laws of any foreign country qualifies as a foreign private issuer, unless both (a) more than 
50% of its outstanding voting securities are held of record directly or indirectly by U.S. 
residents; and (b) either (i) the majority of its executive officers or directors are U.S. 
citizens or residents, (ii) over 50% of its assets are located in the United States, or (iii) its 
business is administered principally in the United States. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4(c). 
147. This type of group-based discrimination is third-degree price discrimination. 
CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 139, at 280, 284. The seller has insufficient information 
to be able to identify each consumer’s individual reservation price. Id. at 284. But the 
seller does have sufficient information to be able to separate consumers into groups and 
charge different prices to the different groups. Id. If the seller could make particularized 
distinctions and charge each consumer her reservation price, then that would be perfect or 
first-degree price discrimination. Id. at 280. 
148. Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 44-54 (enumerating various reduced regulatory hurdles  for 
foreign issuers). Curiously, Howell Jackson characterizes this trend as a sort of 
“Delawarization” of securities law. Howell E. Jackson, Centralization, Competition, and 
Privatization in Financial Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 649, 658 (2001). 
While these SEC rules relax U.S. regulatory requirements for foreign issuers, they hardly 
facilitate free choice. 
149. See supra note 146. 
2002:1363 From Monopolists to Markets? 1399 
 
 
issuers.150 In adopting special, less demanding public offering registration 
forms for use only by foreign issuers, the SEC expressly recognized that 
“imposition on foreign issuers of the same disclosure standards applicable 
to domestic issuers could discourage offerings of foreign securities in the 
United States.”151 Foreign issuers also enjoy easier access to private U.S. 
capital markets  under  Rule  144A than  their  domestic  counterparts.152 
Their offshore offerings under Regulation S are not subject to the same 
restrictions that apply to U.S. issuers.153 Foreign issuers additionally 
enjoy special exemptions related to cross-border tender offers, business 
combinations, and rights offerings.154 They enjoy special accommodation 
from the SEC with respect to scheduling needs and confidential treatment 
of filings.155 
Foreign issuers are also exempt from many of the rules to which 
domestic issuers are subject when they list shares on a national securities 
exchange.156   Foreign issuers are exempt from most of the proxy rules.157 
 
 
150. See Adoption of Foreign Issuer Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act 
Release No. 6437, SEC Docket (CCH), at 964 (Nov. 19, 1982) (adopting Forms F-1, F-2, 
and F-3 in extending integrated disclosure to foreign issuers). 
151. Integrated Disclosure System for Foreign  Private  Issuers, Securities  Act 
Release No. 6360, 24 SEC Docket (CCH), at 3, 4 (Nov. 20, 1981) (proposing forms F-1, 
F-2, and F-3). In weighing the public interest, the SEC characterized reduced disclosure 
for foreign issuers as beneficial insofar as it expanded investment opportunities for U.S. 
investors. See id. 
152. Rule 144A allows for resale of restricted securities to qualified institutional 
buyers. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2002). However, the benefits of Rule 144A for 
domestic issuers are limited by the fact that it is unavailable with respect to any class of 
security that is traded on a U.S. public market. See id.  Domestic issuers would therefore 
be unable to issue common stock to institutional investors in reliance on Rule 144A. 
Foreign issuers, by contrast, are much less likely to be affected by this restriction. Even a 
foreign issuer whose common stock is publicly traded on a major foreign exchange may 
issue common stock in the United States to qualified institutional buyers under 144A, as 
long as its stock is not also listed on a U.S. exchange or NASDAQ. 
153. See  Rule  903(b)(3),  17  C.F.R.  §  230.903(b)(3);  Rule  905,  17  C.F.R.  § 
230.905; see also supra notes 39-55 and accompanying text (discussing Regulation S). 
154. See Cross-Border Tender and Exchange Offers, Business Combinations, and 
Rights Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 7,759, Exchange Act Release No. 45,054, 
[1999-2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,214 at 82,536 (Oct. 26, 1999). 
155. See EDWARD F. GREENE, ET AL., 1 U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
SECURITIES AND DERIVATIVE MARKETS, at 2-45 n. 45 (1999). 
156. These rules are promulgated by the SEC pursuant to its authority under the 
Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78bbbb. 
In general, an issuer without publicly listed shares is also required to register under 
the Exchange Act and be subject to Exchange Act rules if its assets exceed $10 million 
and it has a class of equity security with at least 500 holders of record. See supra note 55. 
However, a foreign private issuer without publicly listed shares is exempt from Exchange 
Act registration and rules if it has no class of equity with more than 300 holders resident in 
the United States, or if it furnishes to the SEC the disclosure information provided in its 
home jurisdiction. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.12g3-2(a) to (b). 
1400 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
 
 
Foreign issuers and their insiders are excused from the reporting 
obligations and short-swing profit rules under Section 16 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.158 Their periodic disclosure obligations are less 
stringent than those applied to domestic issuers. For example, foreign 
issuers file annual reports on Form 20-F, the requirements of which are 
somewhat less demanding than the annual reporting requirements 
applicable to domestic issuers.159 Foreign issuers are excused from filing 
10-Qs, the quarterly disclosures that apply to domestic issuers.160 In 
addition, the SEC has recently proposed to relieve foreign issuers from 
the current requirement of having to reconcile their financial statements to 
U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (U.S. GAAP). Foreign 
issuers would instead be permitted to do their financial reporting under 
international accounting standards promulgated by the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC),161 which are less demanding 
than U.S. GAAP.162 
Domestic  issuers  might  certainly  gripe  about  this  differential 




157. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3. 
158. Id. 
159. See Jackson & Pan, supra note 32, at 666. In addition, a foreign private 
issuer has six months after the end of its fiscal year to file its 20-F report, whereas the 
quarterly and annual reports due from domestic issuers must be filed within three months 
after the end of the fiscal quarter or year. The requirements of Form 20-F conform to 
international disclosure standards adopted by IOSCO. International Disclosure Standards, 
Securities Act Release No. 33-7745, 70 SEC Docket (CCH) at 1993 (Sept. 28, 1999) 
(adopting release); International Disclosure Standards; Correction, Securities Act Release 
No. 33-7983, 75 SEC Docket (CCH) at 522 (June 11, 2001) (correction). 
160. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3. Instead, a foreign private issuer reports on Form 6- 
K, which contains information which has been made publicly available in the home 
jurisdiction. Id. § 230.13a-16. This information is not considered “filed” and is therefore 
not subject to Exchange Act liability for the filing of false or misleading documents with 
the SEC. HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION 
28 (2002). 
161. International Accounting Standards, Securities Act Release No. 33-7801, 71 
SEC Docket (CCH) at 1551 (Feb. 16, 2000).  In 2000, the IASC was restructured as the 
International  Accounting  Standards  Board  (IASB). See  International  Accounting 
Standards Board, Restructuring IASC (1997-1999), at http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/ 
0001.asp?s=1093928&sc={C4B840A7-C000-4252-8AC6-579E55482F7F}&n=91 (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2003). 
162. The fate of the proposal is unclear. Some analysts believe U.S. issuers will 
oppose, since the move allows their foreign competitors the benefit of lower standards. 
However, a similar push by the NYSE to relieve foreign issuers of the burdens of U.S. 
GAAP reconciliation has generated no discernible opposition from large U.S. issuers. See 
infra note 233 and accompanying text. Other opposition may also surface from those 
opposed to lower accounting standards generally. The fear is that U.S. issuers may push 
to use the same lower standards. See Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 
398 n.30. 
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market, local issuers are more or less territorially bound. Regulators are 
therefore free to some extent to ignore the desires of their “captive” 
consumers. There are limits to the degree of discrimination, of course. 
As discrimination increases to the disadvantage of domestic issuers, the 
costs of political action to remedy the discrimination become relatively 
more palatable, an issue I discuss below.163 
 
C. Issuer Choice? 
 
The preceding discussion suggests that in the strongest securities 
markets, national regulators bent on bureaucratic aggrandizement will 
pursue a strategy of regulatory price discrimination. Playing issuer 
choice, however, would make no sense, at least if we credit the 
assumptions of issuer choice proponents concerning regulators’ 
incentives. On this view, regulators’ desire for bureaucratic 
aggrandizement will cause them to overregulate—i.e., impose regulation 
exceeding the regulatory ideal for each firm.164 Therefore, a move from 
the current mandatory territorial system to issuer choice would likely 
result in a number of issuers figuratively “fleeing” from U.S. regulation to 
lower cost regulatory regimes. Issuer choice would allow issuers to 
escape the overzealous regulation of the SEC while continuing to issue 
and list their securities in the United States, effectively breaking the 
SEC’s regulatory monopoly.165 
Assuming regulators’ incentives are as issuer choice proponents say, 
we have to conclude that regulators in price-setting jurisdictions would 
oppose competition and rules creating a competitive framework. More 
likely, the rational regulator will strive to preserve her monopoly and 
pursue a price discrimination strategy.166     Under the current territorial 
 
 
163. See infra Part III.B.3. 
164. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
165. Jack Coffee has questioned this assumption of issuer choice proponents that 
regulators necessarily overregulate. Instead, Coffee identifies a trend suggesting that 
strong regulation may attract issuers, rather than repel them. He argues that foreign firms 
cross-list in the U.S. in order to bond themselves to high disclosure standards that protect 
minority shareholder interests. Listing in the U.S. serves as a commitment device that 
attracts investors and improves firm values. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the 
Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International 
Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (2002). 
166. Some scholars have argued that even if the leaders of the bureaucracy 
espouse these self-aggrandizing goals, lower level employees will have no stake in 
achieving these ends, and agency and transaction costs within the bureaucracy will 
preclude their attainment. This organizational behavior literature predicts lethargy and 
unresponsiveness to either public or private interests. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, 
The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice, Institutional Rhetoric, and the Process of 
Policy Formulation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527 (1990). 
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system, price-setting national regulators need only compete for marginal 
foreign issuers, for whom the regulatory “full price” may be too high. At 
the same time, regulators may maintain their monopolies over captive 
domestic issuers. The SEC’s current program to ease disclosure and other 
requirements for foreign issuers is consistent with this strategy. 
 
D. Price-Taking Jurisdictions 
 
Price-taking jurisdictions face a different set of constraints and 
opportunities from price setters. However, regulators  in price-taking 
jurisdictions are no more likely to pursue issuer choice than in price- 
setting jurisdictions. 
Price-taking jurisdictions will be those with relatively smaller, less 
liquid, less attractive capital markets. For foreign and perhaps even local 
issuers, the small local capital market has many possible substitutes, so 
issuers will be  price sensitive. Such jurisdictions face high  demand 
elasticity and are susceptible to price competition from other jurisdictions. 
Even local companies may have no strong incentive to issue securities 
locally if the regulatory regime is inhospitable. Therefore, price takers 
must take care to assure they do not lose “business” by regulatory 
mispricing of access to their capital markets. Regulators will have a more 
difficult time  pursuing both goals of augmenting their  securities 
bureaucracies and also maximizing the volume of local securities 
offerings and trading. Unlike their counterparts in the largest national 
markets, regulators in price-taking jurisdictions will feel strong pressure 
to lower their regulatory prices in order to maximize the volume of local 
securities activity to preserve the local industry. 
Regulators may therefore have little leverage to negotiate reciprocal 
recognition arrangements with other states. They may have no choice but 
to lower regulatory hurdles unilaterally or to offer unilateral recognition 
of foreign regulatory regimes. This strategy forswears application of 
national regulation to firms issuing or listing in the national market, but it 
at least facilitates securities activity within the jurisdiction to preserve the 
 
 
On the other hand, if survival of the bureaucracy is at stake, it is far more likely that 
all participants in the bureaucracy would band together for the common goal of preserving 
the organization. The goals of the head bureaucrats would faithfully be pursued by the 
rank-and-file. See Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest 
Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 917-18 
(1994). Asking the SEC to give up its territorial regulatory jurisdiction—as issuer choice 
does—might be perceived as a life-and-death struggle. 
In any event, proponents of issuer choice assume that governments will be 
responsive to external stimuli, an assumption I am content to indulge. This indulgence, 
however, hardly points to the emergence of a framework conducive to the regulatory 
competition envisioned by issuer choice advocates. 
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viability of the national market itself.167 And if the regulatory agency is 
reluctant to give up its regulatory jurisdiction, pressure from the securities 
industry may cause national lawgivers to act instead. 
Israel’s recent history provides one salient example. Until recently, 
many Israeli high-tech firms listed their shares on the NYSE without also 
listing with the Tel Aviv exchange. U.S. disclosure requirements for 
foreign issuers are different from, and in some areas less stringent than, 
Israeli disclosure rules.168 These Israeli firms avoided the costs of 
complying with Israeli securities law simply by not listing in Israel. As 
part of an effort to win back listings, the Knesset, Israel’s legislature, 
recently changed its law to provide for unilateral recognition of U.S. 
securities laws, effectively exempting Israeli firms already in compliance 
with U.S. disclosure rules. The Israeli Securities Agency (ISA) had not 
provided such an exemption. It fought the legislative change  along 
various dimensions, but was ultimately unsuccessful. The Knesset chose 
to favor the local securities industry over the ISA’s pleas for more 
stringent regulation.169 
That regulators in price-taking jurisdictions lack market power, 
however, does not imply that they would prefer issuer choice. By 
definition, price takers are forced by market pressures to take the 
regulatory price set by price-setting jurisdictions. They may have to 
accord recognition to the regulatory regimes of particular jurisdictions. 
But this does not suggest that price takers need offer blanket recognition 
to whatever securities regime an issuer might choose. Moreover, the 
interaction of price takers with price setters suggests that even wholesale 
recognition by price takers would not create the competitive regime 
envisioned by issuer choice proponents. Regulators in price-setting 
jurisdictions will not feel the market pressure that affects price takers. 
The market power of the one and the lack of market power of the other 
guaranty that recognition will only go in one direction. Israel may be 
forced to accord recognition to U.S. law, but the United States feels no 
similar pressure to allow local securities activities of issuers regulated 
solely under Israeli law. 
 
 
167. See Amir N. Licht, Stock Exchange Mobility, Unilateral Recognition, and 
the Privatization of Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 583, 596-98 (2001) 
(describing unilateral recognition strategy of small to medium-sized stock exchanges in 
smaller capital markets); Cally Jordan, Regulation of Canadian Capital Markets in the 
1990s: The United States in the Driver’s Seat, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 577, 596 (1995) 
(describing Canada’s proposed strategy of regulatory “free-riding”). 
168. See Amir N. Licht, Managerial Opportunism and Foreign Listing: Some 
Direct Evidence, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 325, 338 (2001). 
169. See id. at 340-41. Roberta Romano also recognizes regulators’ disincentives 
to promote competition, especially regulators from smaller markets. See Romano, Need 
for Competition, supra note 10, at 390-400. 




III. INTEREST GROUPS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
 
Regulators are of course not the only actors affecting the 
development of international securities regulation. Legislative and 
executive action would likely be required to bring about the international 
cooperation necessary for an international issuer choice system. More 
generally, legislators and executives exercise oversight over the structure 
of national securities regulation and the interface among national 
regulatory regimes. Unlike securities regulators, however, legislators and 
executives are unlikely to hold strong personal preferences regarding the 
structure of international securities regulation. They lack the personal 
stake that regulators have.170 Its technical nature and its low visibility and 
salience for the general public ordinarily make securities regulation a 
difficult area around which to rally popular opinion.171 Instead, we can 
expect any reforms to turn on a struggle among the various interests of the 
informed and concentrated few.172 In the United States, besides the 
obvious influence of the SEC, securities lawyers, other industry 
professionals, and corporate interests are likely to weigh in on any 
proposal to effect a major shift in the choice of law rules for U.S. 
securities law. 
The importance  of  interest groups  in  domestic  politics has  been 
recognized for some time.173 However, in international politics, 






170. Rational legislators may delegate to agencies to avoid blame for the costs of 
regulation, while also being able to claim credit for its benefits. See MORRIS P. FIORINA, 
CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 39-49 (1977);  Morris P. 
Fiorina, Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative 
Power, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 33 (1986). 
171. Moreover, as recent events have suggested, a spectacular securities fraud 
case might galvanize public opinion in favor of more stringent regulation. See, e.g., Enron 
Fallout: Public Policy Consequences of Enron’s Collapse, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 
No. 9 (Mar. 4, 2002) (discussing likely regulatory reforms in securities, accounting and 
auditing, corporate governance, and pension areas, among others, following the demise of 
Enron). It is more difficult to imagine a similar spellbinding example of costly 
overregulation that spurs public outrage and ensuing securities deregulation. 
172. See Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & 
ECON. 211 (1976); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 
& MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).   See generally MANCUR  OLSON, THE  LOGIC  OF  COLLECTIVE 
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). 
173. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF 
CONSENT: LOGICAL FORMULATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); OLSON, 
supra note 172. 
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or “billiard ball[s],”174 viewing states as rational unitary actors with stable 
and broadly similar domestic preferences. Under this approach, domestic 
politics matters little if at all. “[T]he internal attributes of [states] are 
given by assumption rather than treated as variables.”175 
The methodological individualism of rational choice theory, 
however, has found its way into international political discourse. 
Nuanced models of state behavior look through the state to the underlying 
interests of individuals and interest groups that influence international 
affairs.176 Scholars of political economy use “two-level” games to model 
this relation between domestic influences and international relations.177 
Domestic politics matters for international policy, and unitary actor 
models of  state  behavior  run  the  risk  of  missing important  domestic 
causal variables that affect international policy.178 
 
 
174. Andrew Moravcsik, Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic 
Theories of International Bargaining, in DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL 
BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 5 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1993). 
175. Robert O. Keohane, Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and 
Beyond, in NEO-REALISM AND ITS CRITICS 165 (Robert O. Keohane ed., 1986). 
176. The longstanding realist tradition of treating states as unitary actors may be 
justifiable in national security contexts. If national survival is truly at stake, then one 
might plausibly assume all groups within the nation could unite to pursue the singular goal 
of survival. However, this simplifying assumption becomes less useful when commercial 
and economic relations are at issue, since domestic factionalism is likely to matter a great 
deal. See ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE 
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 29 (1984). 
177. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two- 
Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427 (1988); see also DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: 
INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS, supra note 174; HELEN V. MILNER, 
INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INFORMATION: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS (1997); Jonathan R. Macey, Chicken Wars as a Prisoners’ Dilemma: What’s 
in a Game?, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 448 (1989) (reviewing JOHN A.C. CONYBEARE, 
TRADE WARS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL RIVALRY 
(1987)) (noting importance of public choice analysis in understanding trade policy 
formation). 
178. See Keisuke Iida, When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter?: Two- 
Level Games with Uncertainty, 37 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 403, 403-04 (1993) (criticizing the 
realist tradition of "treat[ing] nation-states as unitary actors,” and noting that “[i]n reality, 
foreign policy decisions are the result of political processes within nation-states”); 
Moravcsik, supra note 174, at 4; Duncan Snidal, Coordination versus Prisoners’ 
Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 923, 925-26 (1985) (acknowledging drawbacks to realist assumption “[t]reating 
states as goal-seeking actors with well-defined preferences”). Moreover, speaking of 
states’ interests and states’ preferences may be anthropomorphic: “Institutions in general, 
and governments in particular, do not have preferences, people do. Governmental policy 
reflects the preferences of powerful constituents, not some mystically determined set of 
preferences that might be described as the ‘national interest.’” Colombatto & Macey, 
supra note 59, at 931-32; see also Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to 
Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1169 (2000) (criticizing traditional 




Domestic politics matters because the state is not a unitary 
actor. Groups within it have different policy preferences 
because they are differentially affected by government policies. 
Any change in policies, as might occur because of international 
cooperation, has domestic distributional and electoral 
consequences. These domestic consequences are the “stuff” of 
politics.179 
 
In this Part, I consider interest groups and the international 
cooperation that would be necessary to implement issuer choice. My 
discussion focuses primarily on the U.S. context and price-setting 
jurisdictions. I first discuss likely interest group alignments that would 
frustrate achievement of international issuer choice agreements.180 
The discussion in the preceding Part suggests that regulators will be 
an important interest group in their own right. Given their assumed 
incentives of bureaucratic aggrandizement, they will prefer regulatory 
price discrimination to issuer choice. Moreover, several features of the 
existing structure of domestic and international securities regulation 
suggest that securities regulators will dominate any endeavors toward 
international regulatory coordination. Regulators have significant 
informational and other advantages over legislators and executives who 
would attempt to oversee their regulatory activities. In addition, I show 
below the likely absence of any domestic interest group unambiguously 
committed to issuer choice. This further reduces its likelihood. 
Identification of regulatory price discrimination as a plausible 
strategy for regulators in price-setting jurisdictions is important to the 
ensuing interest group analysis because it more realistically describes the 
political and policy alternatives for the various interested groups than 
have previous commentators. To the extent issuer choice advocates have 
discussed the politics of issuer choice, they have tended to pose the policy 
 
 
emphasis on government interests, as opposed to individual interests, in U.S. conflicts 
scholarship and court opinions). 
179. MILNER, supra note 177, at 16. 
180. One must necessarily speak in terms of probabilities as opposed to proofs in 
attempting to forecast interest group alignments, especially in the international context. 
As Andrew Guzman has noted: 
The difficulty in applying public choice to normative analyses . . . is that the 
outcome of interest group politics is very difficult to predict. It is, therefore, 
difficult to construct a model of government decisionmaking—even if one 
focuses on relatively well-defined areas of law such as antitrust or securities. 
Once one adds an international dimension to the problem, the task is even 
more difficult. 
Guzman, supra note 33, at 902 (citation omitted). 
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alternatives in stark contrast. Private choice reform is contrasted to the 
status quo of mandatory disclosure, which is characterized as a monolithic 
endeavor by regulatory monopolists to force rules upon recalcitrant 
issuers. Identification of the price discrimination strategy suggests that 
regulators may be more responsive to market pressure and to pressure 
from interested groups than the standard regulatory monopolist 
description implies.181 This responsiveness tends to undermine not only 
claims concerning the inefficiency of the status quo, but also issuer choice 
advocates’ implicit assertion that interested groups exist that would prefer 
issuer choice. 
A lack of interest group support is not the only obstacle to issuer 
choice cooperation. As with securities regulation generally, international 
agreements concerning regulatory jurisdiction would necessarily be 
technical, complex affairs. Detailing, monitoring, and enforcing 
commitments would be difficult, and this difficulty would likely 
discourage commitment ex ante. This is especially damaging for the 
prospects for issuer choice. Regulatory price discrimination is the status 
quo. Without useful international agreements, no reform—whether issuer 
choice or some other approach—can emerge. 
I first explain regulators’ unique role as the dominant interest group 
in any international undertaking for regulatory coordination. I  then 
discuss other interest groups, their various stakes in promoting or 
opposing issuer choice versus regulatory price discrimination, and their 
likely influence on national policymakers. Finally, I note the demands of 
international coalition formation and the effects of complexity and 
ambiguity in achieving international cooperation. Along with the two 
possible approaches of issuer choice and regulatory price discrimination, I 
also consider harmonization. I ultimately conclude that of these three, 
issuer choice is the least likely to arise. 
 
A. Regulators’ Dominant Role in International Securities Regulation 
 
Given the highly detailed and technical nature of securities 
regulation, regulators will have significant informational advantages over 
legislators and executives, who ordinarily have little incentive to devote 
resources to monitoring regulators or educating themselves about 
regulators’  activities.182       In  the  even  narrower  area  of  international 
 
 
181. John Coates makes a similar point regarding SEC responsiveness to issuers. 
See Coates, supra note 137, at 553. 
182. “Although the nominal relation of a bureau and its sponsor is that of a 
bilateral monopoly, the relative incentives and available information, under most 
conditions, give the bureau the overwhelmingly dominant monopoly power.” NISKANEN, 
supra note 82, at 30. 
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securities regulation, which requires some knowledge of regulatory 
practices in foreign jurisdictions, regulators’ informational advantage is 
overwhelming. Without some way of ameliorating this information 
deficit, legislators and executives will be in a poor position to initiate any 
change that regulators oppose. Regulators’ opposition may therefore be 
fatal for issuer choice.183 
Informed interest groups may assist policy makers in overcoming 
information deficits.184 However, as I describe below, it is unlikely—at 
least in regulatory price-setting jurisdictions—that any interest group will 
emerge that unambiguously supports issuer choice. Without an interest 
group champion with sufficient interest and resources to counter 
regulators’ informational superiority, the prospects for issuer choice are 
bleak.185 
Absent support of important interest groups, national lawmakers will 
likely be reluctant to back issuer choice over regulators’ opposition. 
Politicians are risk averse, and a move to issuer choice presents 
uncertainty. Politicians will be reluctant to assume publicly the 
responsibility for the uncertain outcomes resulting from the broad 
deregulation of securities markets that issuer choice would entail.186 Even 
assuming the improved capital market efficiency that issuer choice 
proponents claim would result, that outcome is not sexy. Certain 
interested groups might understand and appreciate this result in the 
abstract, but it is difficult to measure or demonstrate in the short run, and 
might not be salient to the general public.187   The downside political risk 
 
 
183. See ANNE M. KHADEMIAN, THE SEC AND CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION: 
THE POLITICS OF EXPERTISE 188 (1992) (describing virtual veto power of SEC as to 
legislation it opposes). 
184. See MILNER, supra note 177, at 23 (“[T]he ‘solution’ to the information 
problem of legislatures is to depend on informed interest groups.”). 
185. See id. at 22 (asserting necessity of at least one interest group to endorse 
policy as to which legislature suffers information deficit). 
186. See KHADEMIAN, supra note 183, at 12 (describing risk aversion of 
legislators with respect to securities policy). 
187. This is not to say that deregulation may never result from widespread public 
indignation and in the face of interest group opposition. See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer 
L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a 
Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 168 (1990) (discussing importance of  “public 
agenda” in reducing political slack, which otherwise enables regulators to favor private 
interests). Deregulation has occurred in securities and other industries, but is typically a 
result of changing economic conditions and shifting interest group alignments. One 
famous instance of securities deregulation was the abolition of the NYSE’s fixed 
commission structure with the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 
89 Stat. 97, 107 (1975). However, this deregulatory moment is not inconsistent with 
interest group theories of regulation. Though the NYSE was a powerful opponent of 
deregulation of fixed commission rates, the rise of institutional investors created a 
powerful counterweight to NYSE influence.  Moreover, institutional investors’ increasing 
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seems greater. A loss of investor confidence, perhaps followed by a 
market downturn, would not only hurt private interests. It would also put 
securities deregulation on the “public agenda,”188 drawing negative 
attention from the general public and damaging the political fortunes of 
any sponsoring lawmakers. 
Incremental moves in the direction of private choice—as opposed to 
wholesale adoption overnight—could of course reduce the scope of 
legislative uncertainty. For instance, the United States could first agree 
with Canada that both countries’ issuers could avail themselves of either 
country’s securities regime.189 And then either or both could reach a 
similar agreement with the United Kingdom.190  But even this incremental 
approach may be fraught with uncertainty. Even with the limited 
recognition of disclosure systems between the United States and Canada 
under  MJDS,191    dissatisfaction  with  Canadian  enforcement  recently 
 
 
ability to avoid fixed commissions by trading on regional exchanges and over the counter 
also put competitive pressure on fixed commissions, making their abolition less drastic a 
change than it might otherwise appear. See SUSAN M. PHILLIPS & J. RICHARD ZECHER, 
THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, at ch. 4 (1981).  Ideologically driven deregulation 
may occur in the face of opposition from concentrated groups. However, this 
phenomenon apparently occurs primarily where expert consensus strongly—perhaps 
uniformly—supports deregulation, which is not the case here. See MARTHA DERTHICK & 
PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION (1985) (discussing pro-competitive 
deregulation in the airline, trucking, and telecommunications industries in the 1970s and 
early 1980s, which occurred despite powerful industry support for regulatory protection). 
188. See Levine & Forrence, supra note 187, at 191-92. 
Those not specially affected by regulatory information do not ordinarily invest 
in acquiring it. 
However, at any given time in any given polity, there is a small set of 
issues that has become the object of intense public attention. These issues are 
very widely attended to. They are covered in virtually every issue of every 
printed news medium, and are reported on constantly by the broadcast media. 
These issues pervade the information atmosphere. . . . Let us call the set of 
these issues the “public agenda.” 
Id.  
189. Canada and the United States have implemented MJDS, a system of mutual 
recognition for their respective disclosure rules. See supra note 79 and accompanying 
text. While MJDS allows qualifying companies of both countries to rely on their home 
country disclosures to issue securities in the other jurisdiction, it does not affect issuer 
choice. It does not permit a U.S issuer to select application of Canadian disclosure rules 
or vice versa. 
190. A shared language and business culture with the United States make Canada 
and the United Kingdom the most promising candidates  for a nascent  issuer choice 
arrangement with the United States. Cf. Scott, supra note 52, at 84  (“The  United 
Kingdom would be a logical candidate for the MJDS extension, given its shared Anglo- 
Saxon tradition and English language with the United States and Canada.”). Apparently, 
at some point, the United Kingdom was considered a prime candidate for expansion of 
MJDS. See id. at 85. 
191. See supra note 75 and accompanying text and notes 189-90. 
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caused the SEC to consider eliminating the program.192 While the Ontario 
Securities Commission’s responsiveness to the SEC’s concerns seems to 
have preserved the program for the time being,193 the experience 
illustrates the difficulty of predicting ex ante how cross-border 
recognition of securities law may  play out.194 In addition, it further 
emphasizes the critical role of regulators in monitoring and managing 
cross-border cooperative arrangements on securities regulation. 
Another factor that will tend to inhibit politicians from embracing 
issuer choice absent interest group support is their short time horizons.195 
Even if issuer choice were ultimately to produce net benefits to society, 
the timing of the realization of the potential costs and benefits would 
dissuade politicians from backing it. Issuer choice advocates 
acknowledge the probable switching costs involved with its 
implementation.196 An initial period of confusion would ensue, as issuers, 
investors, and regulators sorted out the myriad details of integrating 
foreign securities rules for local securities transactions. It seems likely 
that over time, a handful of regimes would predominate in any given 
national market, such that the menu of probable choices would become 
manageable and scale economies could be realized.197 In the meantime, 
though, a real possibility would exist of a market hiccup or dramatic 
scandal that could be linked to issuer choice deregulation. 
The problem for politicians is that switching costs are borne largely 
in the short run, while the claimed benefits of issuer choice would accrue, 
if at all, in the long run. As earlier noted, the general public would be 
unable to appraise immediately the claimed long-run efficiency 




192. See Scott, supra note 52, at 82 (describing SEC dissatisfaction). 
193. See Eric Reguly, To the Point: OSC Deserves Credit for Saving Threatened 
Access to U.S., GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 18, 2001, at B10 (describing Ontario Securities 
Commission improvements in disclosure enforcement responding to SEC pressure). 
194. For further discussion of indeterminacy in international securities regulatory 
cooperation, see infra Part II.C.2. 
195. See Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of 
Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 261 (2000). 
196. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 924-27 (discussing possibility of 
information overload from issuer choice and possible remedial measures). 
197. See id. 
198. In the short run under issuer choice, in the best case, issuers in the United 
States might choose more lax regulation because U.S. law is too burdensome. But that 
would merely highlight for the public the weaknesses of the U.S. regulatory regime. This 
might prove satisfying for issuer choice advocates, but it is not clear that any legislators 
would end up looking good. Why were the securities laws so burdensome in the first 
place? In the worst case, if issuers chose more lax regulation to commit fraud or behave 
opportunistically toward security holders, U.S. investors would suffer, and legislators 
would surely look bad.  I am indebted to Jill Fisch, Professor of Law, Fordham University 
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forces elected officials to discount the future severely. A politician who 
must stand for re-election every few years will prefer policies with 
discernible short-term payoffs, with less regard for long-term effects that 
occur in the next election cycle. Any long-term benefits will generally 
accrue to the political benefit of some other politician.199 
In the end, issuer choice is not a reform to which legislators will 
naturally be attracted without interest group support. The potential 
benefits are politically murky and not easily realized in the short term; the 
possible costs are politically salient—hardly an appealing policy 
prescription for risk averse politicians. In addition, regulators will enjoy 
significant information advantages over elected officials with respect to 
international securities regulatory policy. Regulators’ opposition to issuer 
choice, then, will be a significant impediment to its adoption. 
 
B. Interest Groups 
 
As noted above, interest group involvement could theoretically 
overcome politicians’ reluctance and information deficit with respect to 
issuer choice.200 How would various interest groups line up as between a 
price discrimination approach—a plausible characterization of the status 
quo—and issuer choice reform? It would appear that several important 
groups would oppose issuer choice but none would unambiguously 
support it. Those with significant investments in the status quo—either 
human capital investments or investments in institutional structures— 
would support regulatory price discrimination and oppose a  move to 
private choice. In particular, regulators and those paid to advise issuers 
concerning regulation—primarily securities lawyers and accountants— 
could be expected to oppose vigorously any move toward international 
issuer choice. Securities firms and exchanges might theoretically be 
attracted to the increased volume of securities activity that issuer choice 
promises.   However, these groups also have large stakes in the current 
U.S. regulatory structure, including built-in informational advantages over 
other market participants. Moreover, regulatory price discrimination can 
increase securities volume as well, without the disruption that would 





School of Law and Director, Fordham Center for Corporate, Securities, and Financial 
Law, for this observation. 
199. Interest groups with long-term stakes in an issue might be able to persuade 
politicians to adopt longer time horizons. However, it is unclear whether any such interest 
group exists with respect to issuer choice. See infra Part III.B. 
200. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text. 
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The group left out of this rent fest, of course, is domestic issuers. 
They are more or less tied to the U.S. market.201 Lower regulatory 
standards for foreign issuers can only harm domestic issuers by lowering 
foreign rivals’ costs of capital, placing domestic issuers at a competitive 
disadvantage. However, opposition to regulatory price discrimination 
would not likely drive issuers to support private choice. Harmonization 
may be issuers’ favored approach. 
I elaborate on these analyses below. 
 
1. LAWYERS AND ACCOUNTANTS 
 
As already noted, maximizing regulators would not want to have to 
compete for a market that they have already captured. Lawyers and 
accountants will share similar  incentives with regulators. With their 
expertise in national securities law, lawyers have significant 
undiversifiable human capital investments that are more or less 
territorially bound. Accountants will possess similar territorially-bound 
expertise concerning U.S. GAAP and financial disclosure requirements 
under U.S. securities law. In that sense, these groups benefit from the 
national regulatory monopoly as much as regulators do. They should 
therefore support the existing territorial system, as well as regulators’ 
attempts to expand the reach of national law by attracting foreign issuers 
through price discrimination. 
U.S. lawyers’ stock in trade, for example, is their ability to advise 
with respect to U.S. law. U.S. lawyers are expert in crafting disclosure 
documents for their client firms subject to the securities laws. Corporate 
and plaintiffs’-side securities lawyers are expert at litigating class actions 
under the complex liability and procedural rules peculiar to the U.S. 
regime of private enforcement. For their part, U.S. accountants have 
developed expertise in producing and auditing the complex and detailed 
financial statements required of issuers under U.S. securities laws,202 as 
well as expertise in avoiding the possible securities fraud liability that 





201. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. While domestic issuers might be 
able to issue new securities in overseas markets, their existing listings in the United States 
subject them to the U.S. disclosure apparatus. Delisting locally is unlikely to be a useful 
alternative, at least in the near term. 
202. Regulation S-X describes the accounting rules applicable to SEC filings and 
the audited financial statements required under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. 
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-01 to .12-29. 
203. See HAZEN, supra note 34, § 9.6 (describing SEC auditing and accounting 
requirements). 
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Under an issuer choice regime, there is a high probability that 
demand for all this expertise would decline. Most analysts agree that U.S. 
disclosure requirements are among the most stringent in the world. If as 
commonly assumed among issuer choice advocates, this level of 
disclosure is suboptimal for some nontrivial percentage of firms, then the 
demand for U.S. securities lawyers’ and accountants’ expertise would 
likely decline. Issuers may choose to issue in the United States, but under 
the less stringent disclosure obligations of other nations. In that case, the 
volume of securities sold and traded within the United States would 
probably rise, while the number of issuers subject to U.S. disclosure rules 
would not, and may in fact decline. The armies of private lawyers, 
accountants, and other professionals who produce corporate disclosure 
documents would see no benefit in the increased volume of securities 
activity in the United States.204 
More generally, lawyers’ and accountants’ livelihood would depend 
to a great extent on the outcome of the competition for law. If one’s 
home country law turned out not to be popular among issuers, the demand 
for legal and accounting expertise would decline, and their professional 
and financial fortunes would suffer. Among those invested in the current 
regime of U.S. securities regulation, besides the SEC, private securities 
lawyers and accountants have perhaps the largest stake in maintaining the 
status quo—including further steps in the direction of price 
discrimination—and opposing issuer choice. 
A few qualifications to the above analysis may be in order. 
Individual lawyers and accountants could possibly attempt to remedy the 
territorial limits of their expertise by diversifying their human capital and 
developing expertise in the securities laws and accounting rules of other 
jurisdictions besides their home countries. However, given differences in 
language, culture, and business practices, as well as the complexity and 
nuance of both securities law and accounting rules, it would likely be 
quite difficult for many lawyers or accountants to develop sufficient 
expertise in a foreign securities regulatory regime to be able to compete 
for business with professionals indigenous to the jurisdiction. Lawyers 
might in addition have to navigate whatever market-restricting 
professional certification requirements might apply to the practice of law 
in any particular foreign jurisdiction. Rather than take up these burdens, 
lawyers and accountants in price-setting jurisdictions are more likely to 
support the status quo and oppose issuer choice. 
Lawyers and accountants might instead diversify their human capital 
internationally by forming partnerships to pool different types of legal 
 
 
204. For  a  discussion  of  the  costs  of  employing  these  armies  of  corporate 
disclosure professionals, see PHILLIPS & ZECHER, supra note 187, at 44. 
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expertise. Just as a diversified investment portfolio enables investors to 
eliminate the effects of unsystematic risk, diverse human capital assets 
within a well-diversified law firm or accounting firm enable the firm, as a 
whole, to profit despite downturns in particular practice areas at particular 
times. Profits may be generated by different partners at different times. 
Over the long run, the peeks and troughs of any given partner’s practice 
activity and profit production are smoothed out via the profit-sharing 
arrangements of the firm. 
Firms can diversify not only across practice areas, of course, but also 
across countries, so that as economic conditions and revenues change 
within countries, or as legal or accounting work migrates across borders, 
an internationally diversified firm is able to smooth out country-based 
peeks and troughs just as it does for practice areas. At least theoretically, 
an internationally diversified firm would be indifferent as to which 
jurisdiction’s securities laws applied to particular transactions, since it 
would have expertise in the law of all important jurisdictions. It would be 
indifferent as between issuer choice and regulatory price discrimination, 
except to the extent either would generate more securities work on a 
global basis. 
This possibility of international diversification, however, may not 
significantly alter the territorial quality of individual lawyers’ and 
accountants’ expertise and economic interests. Even in international 
alliances, firms typically dole out profits based roughly on who is 
responsible for their creation. That is, each partner eats what she kills. 
While all members may share in the firm’s overall good fortune, they do 
not typically share equally. The partners responsible for more profits— 
however “responsible” is defined within each firm—are usually more 
equal than others.205 In terms of issuer choice proposals, this means that 
despite being a member of a diversified international firm, a U.S. 
securities lawyer or accountant will still prefer to maximize the amount of 
securities work that applies U.S. rules. She would rather do the work and 
generate the profits than have her partner in another jurisdiction do it. 
Finally, depending on how enforcement is structured under an issuer 
choice regime, securities litigators might possibly see an increased 
demand for their services. Proponents of issuer choice understandably 
have not reached consensus as to the appropriate choice of forum for 
enforcement of the substantive rules chosen by any issuer.206      If the 
 
 
205. Cf. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 133 (Penguin Books 1996) (1946) (“All 
animals are equal.  But some animals are more equal than others.”).  See generally David 
B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law 
Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493, 535-36 (1996) (discussing 
competitive nature of law partnerships). 
206. See infra notes 239-42. 
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issuer’s home country were to become the standard venue for 
enforcement under an issuer choice regime, then it is at least conceivable 
that U.S. securities litigators could have as much or more work under 
issuer choice. Suppose issuer choice proponents are correct that free 
choice would unleash a torrent of heretofore suppressed demand for 
capital by issuers and demand for securities by investors.207  Under this 
view, issuer choice remedies a regulatory mispricing and eliminates 
deadweight losses from this mispricing. If the issuer’s home country is 
where private litigation is to be brought, and if U.S. issuers issue more 
securities worldwide under issuer choice than under the current 
mandatory U.S. regime, then it is at least conceivable that U.S. securities 
litigators might end up with more work. Even if U.S. lawyers needed to 
rely on foreign experts regarding the substantive law of the firm-selected 
regime, presumably they would still retain a competitive edge in litigating 
cases in U.S. courts and would be the principal lawyers in those cases. 
This scenario further assumes, of course, that U.S. issuers would select 
regimes with nontrivial regulation and that effective private remedies 
would survive  in  an  issuer choice  system. In  addition, international 
arbitration may emerge as a popular method of resolving international 
securities disputes under an issuer choice regime.208 If so, U.S. lawyers 
may be particularly well-suited to compete for retentions. 
On the other hand, these various possible benefits to U.S. lawyers 
under issuer choice are quite speculative. Lawyers being risk averse in 
terms of their financial interests, we can expect that in general, they 
would prefer the bird in the hand—steady augmentation of their fortunes 
through regulatory price discrimination—to the indeterminate number of 
birds they might enjoy under issuer choice. 
Lawyers and accountants are likely to constitute well-organized and 
well-financed interest groups. Their undiversified human capital and high 
per capita economic stakes in continued and expanding application of 









207. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 916-17; Romano, Empowering 
Investors, supra note 10, at 2362-64. 
208. See Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 409. 
209. Cf. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group 
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 498-509 (1987) (describing 
self-interested role of Delaware corporate bar in influencing course of Delaware corporate 
law). 
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2. EXCHANGES AND SECURITIES FIRMS 
 
In contrast to securities lawyers, the fortunes of exchanges and 
securities firms are tied to the volume of securities offered and traded in 
the national markets in which they operate, without any necessary 
connection to applicable law.210 To the extent that territorial regulations 
deter securities activity within a given jurisdiction, exchanges and 
securities firms would favor reducing those regulatory  hurdles.211 
According to issuer choice proponents, offering issuers a choice of 
regulatory regimes less stringent and costly than the U.S. regime would 
almost certainly increase securities activity in the United States in the 
long run. Moreover, in a world of private choice, according to issuer 
choice advocates, this desire of securities industry interests to maximize 
the local volume of securities activity acts as a positive influence on 
national regulators. Regulators’ desire to benefit their important 
constituents in the industry would spur them to propose regulation that 
issuers want, since issuers would likely issue securities in the jurisdiction 
whose regulation they select.212 
That securities industry interests are promoted through deregulatory 
reforms that increase local volume, however, does not necessarily mean 
the industry would favor issuer choice. All sorts of regulatory changes 
could spur an increase in local volume. Regulatory price discrimination, 
for instance, does just that. Perhaps recognizing this, the NYSE actively 
lobbied the SEC to lower certain regulatory requirements for foreign 
issuers in the United States,213 efforts that were rewarded with some of the 
special rules for foreign issuers that exemplify the SEC’s regulatory price 
discrimination strategy.214 The NYSE continues to lobby for relaxed 
accounting reconciliation requirements for certain categories of foreign 
issuers. James Cochrane, senior vice president and chief economist for 
the NYSE, has stated that exempting world-class foreign issuers from 
U.S. GAAP reconciliation is the NYSE's “number one priority.”215     In 
 
 
210. As with law firms, exchanges and securities firms may diversify  across 
borders. See Licht, supra note 167, at 592 (discussing recent stock exchange mergers and 
alliances). With exchanges, because international alliances are a recent development, it is 
difficult to tell the extent to which exchanges may lose their national character. 
211. See JAMES A. FANTO & ROBERTA S. KARMEL, A REPORT ON THE ATTITUDES 
OF FOREIGN COMPANIES REGARDING A U.S. LISTING 5 (NYSE Working Paper No. 97-101, 
1997); Choi & Guzman, supra note 87, at 1874; Fox, Political Economy, supra note 19, at 
770. 
212. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
213. Licht, supra note 167, at 597. 
214. See supra notes 148-63 and accompanying text. 
215. See  James  L.  Cochrane,  Are  U.S.  Regulatory  Requirements  for  Foreign 
Firms Appropriate?, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S58, S61 (1994). 
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addition, while NYSE rules contain certain corporate governance 
requirements for listed companies, foreign issuers may readily obtain 
exemptions from these rules.216 Similar exemptions are available under 
the listing rules of the American Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ. The 
SEC, recognizing the competitive interests of the exchanges in 
encouraging foreign listings,217 acquiesced in this approach.218 
Critics of the SEC are also quick to point out the well-organized 
securities industry interests that benefit from the SEC’s mandatory 
disclosure system and other policies. Lawyers and accountants get paid to 
produce disclosure documents, and securities analysts, portfolio 
managers, and other securities professionals get the benefit of this 
publicly disclosed information for free, information they find quite useful 
but would otherwise have to pay for.219 Industry professionals may also 
be the ultimate beneficiaries of SEC rules against insider trading, since 
those rules eliminate from the market the only potential traders with better 





216. See NYSE, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 
103.00 (1999). 
217. The relaxation of requirements applicable to foreign issuers was . . . an 
SEC response to the needs of the U.S. stock exchanges and their investment 
banking members to develop a U.S. market for foreign securities. Specifically, 
they argued that differences between the corporate governance practices of 
foreign issuers and the corporate governance requirements of the U.S. 
exchanges would unduly inhibit those companies from listing on U.S. 
exchanges. Accordingly, the SEC was convinced that the special treatment of 
foreign issuers was warranted. 
Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance, 57 BUS. 
LAW. 1487, 1514-15 (2002). 
218. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by 
the American Stock Exchange, Inc. and New York Stock Exchange, Inc. to Amend the 
Exchanges’ Listing Standards for Foreign Companies, Exchange Act Rel. No. 24,634, 52 
Fed. Reg. 24,230 (June 29, 1987). 
219. See PHILLIPS & ZECHER, supra note 187, at 22-23. One report found 
securities analysts to be the group most reliant on mandatory filings, as 77.8% of sell-side 
and 91.3% of buy-side analysts reported the Form 10-K was vital to them. See id. at 37 
(citing U.S. Congress, House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Report of the 
Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 95th Cong., Comm. Print 95-29 (Nov. 3, 1977), at 62). 
220. See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A 
Private Interest Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & 
ECON. 311 (1987). It is unclear to what extent the recently promulgated Regulation FD 
will affect the benefits to industry of insider trading prohibitions. “FD” stands “fair 
disclosure,” and among other things, Regulation FD prohibits issuers from making 
selective disclosure  of  material  nonpublic  information See Selective Disclosure and 
Insider Trading, Release No. 33-7881, Release No. 34-43154, 73 SEC Docket (CCH), at 3 
(Aug. 15, 2000). 
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Given their stakes in the status quo, and the fact that the SEC’s 
current regulatory price discrimination strategy will increase the volume 
of local securities activity, industry interests in the United States would 
likely be reluctant to reject the benefits they currently enjoy in favor of 
issuer choice, a reform with uncertain impact on their rents. Private 
institutional arrangements have grown up around the SEC’s mandatory 
disclosure system. As with lawyers and accountants, securities 
professionals—investment bankers, brokers, analysts, and others—have 
human and institutional capital  invested in existing practices. These 
practices likely generate increasing returns in the current environment, 
while switching to issuer choice may impose high start-up costs before 
comparable benefits were realized, if ever. 
 
Institutions and policies may encourage individuals and 
organizations to invest in specialized skills, deepen relationships 
with other individuals and organizations, and develop particular 
political and social identities. These activities increase the 
attractiveness of existing institutional arrangements relative to 
hypothetical alternatives. As social actors make commitments 
based on existing institutions and policies, their cost of exit 
from established arrangements generally rises dramatically.221 
 
Law reform that would drastically diminish the value of existing 
arrangements or render them obsolete will not likely garner the support of 
exchanges   or   securities   firms.222 As between regulatory price 
discrimination and issuer choice, exchanges and securities firms in the 
United States will likely prefer the former. 
 
3. ISSUERS AND INVESTORS 
 
In something of an apparent irony, it appears that “corporate 
America”—issuers and institutional investors, who are supposed direct 
beneficiaries of issuer choice—implicitly reject it. John Coates notes that 
corporate America has instead supported harmonized regulation, both 




221. Pierson, supra note 195, at 259. 
222. The prospects for substantial cost-reducing modification in our 
corporate disclosure system are . . . slim when viewed from the perspective of 
the economics of regulation. Two relatively small, well-organized groups 
have strong and understandable interests in seeing that the SEC corporate 
system is preserved and expanded, namely, professionals who produce the 
disclosure documents and who receive them free. 
PHILLIPS & ZECHER, supra note 187, at 51. 
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from issuer choice.223 On the national level, Coates points out, businesses 
supported expanded federal securities law preemption of state disclosure 
rules.224 They supported further centralization of federal securities law 
jurisdiction in response to the perceived circumvention of federal 
limitations on private securities suits via state court suits.225 On the 
international level, U.S. industries support international harmonization of 
accounting standards, and not diversity.226 Coates suggests this push for 
harmonization and failure to embrace issuer choice show that issuer 
choice proposals lack merit.227 
A more nuanced explanation may also be available. The behavior of 
corporate America may not necessarily be inconsistent with the claims of 
issuer choice proponents as to the beneficent effects of such a system. 
Moreover, at least on the domestic level, issuers’ support for 
federalization of securities law may not evidence a distaste for regulatory 
competition among states—which was never among the choices 
available—as much as distaste for the burden of complying with multiple 
standards. Complying with one mandatory set of rules is easier and 
cheaper than complying with fifty-one mandatory sets of rules. But this is 
not to say that issuers would not prefer, if permitted, to choose just one set 
of rules that would apply nationwide. 
However, the timing of the realization of these claimed benefits may 
matter, as they do for politicians.228 For risk averse firm managers with 
short time horizons, the move to an issuer choice system may simply be 
too disruptive in the short term. Switching costs may be substantial.229 
Short-term earnings performance drives stock prices and affects 
managers’ decision making. Managers may not relish unpredictable 
short-term perturbations in stock prices caused by wholesale changes in 
the securities regulatory structure. Managers understand the current rules. 
They and their professional advisers understand how to operate under 
them. Analysts and institutional investors understand how to price 
securities under the current regulatory structures. By contrast, even if 
issuer choice would lead ultimately to lower capital costs, markets and 
market professionals would require some time to adjust to such a radical 
 
 
223. Coates, supra note 137, at 538-39. 
224. Id.  at  538  (discussing  National  Securities  Markets  Improvement  Act  of 
1996). 
225. Id. (discussing Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998). 
226. Id. at 539. 
227. Id. at 542. 
228. See supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text. 
229. “[T]he lack of corporate demand for devolution[ is] not surprising in a path- 
dependent world where any change requires costly adjustments and the loss of sunk 
capital investments by some participants.” William J. Carney, Jurisdictional Choice in 
Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 717, 720-21 (2001). 
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change. How markets would behave during this transition period would 
be difficult to predict. The sheer uncertainty may deter managers and 
investors from supporting such a change. In addition, managers in high 
regulation jurisdictions like the United States may fear a negative 
signaling effect from opting out of U.S. regulation. Finally, not only 
would managers have to worry about the price effect of issuer choice on 
their own securities in absolute terms, but they would also have to be 
concerned about the relative impact of this change on their competitors’ 
capital raising activities.230 For all these reasons, risk averse managers 
with short time horizons may simply not wish to undertake to manage the 
transition from one equilibrium to another, even if the new equilibrium is 
ultimately more advantageous once achieved.231 
Regardless of whether the current position of corporate America 
undercuts the supposed longer-term benefits of issuer choice, it certainly 
calls into question the near-term political feasibility of issuer choice 
proposals. On the other hand, U.S. issuers also oppose regulatory price 
discrimination, which forces them to pay higher “prices” than their 
foreign counterparts in terms of more stringent regulatory requirements. 
Their push for harmonization is consistent with this stance. It may be that 
for U.S. issuers, harmonization represents the most fruitful short-term 
strategy to raise capital costs for their foreign rivals. 
U.S. issuer opposition to regulatory price discrimination, however, 
should not be overstated. Corporations have in the past organized 
effectively to affect securities regulatory policy, through such collective 
organizations as the Business Roundtable and the like.232 However, there 
is some reason to believe that the differential regulatory burdens as 
between domestic and foreign issuers would have to be substantial, and 
the number of foreign issuers benefiting from disparate regulation would 




230. Especially with respect to foreign rivals who are not already raising capital 
in the United States, U.S. issuers currently enjoy a natural advantage because of their 
mastery of the system. As issuer choice advocates and others have suggested, the 
regulatory and other intricacies of capital raising in the United States may inhibit some 
foreign entrants. A move to issuer choice, however, would very likely erode this natural 
advantage that U.S. issuers currently enjoy. 
231. In a related context, Romano has argued that risk averse firm managers may 
prefer a maximin strategy with respect to law reform, preferring the status quo to 
unpredictability in corporate law. See Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in 
Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709, 722 (1987) (explaining why firm managers may 
prefer Delaware’s constitutional provision requiring a two-thirds supermajority for 
amendments to its corporation law). 
232. See Coates, supra note 137, at 540-42 (discussing role of industry 
representatives in overcoming collective action problems to enact major federal securities 
law reform). 
2002:1363 From Monopolists to Markets? 1421 
 
 
commit resources to political action. The existence of differential 
burdens of mandatory disclosure, for example, is not likely to be the first 
thing on a CEO’s mind. U.S. firms have adapted to their disclosure 
burdens, the costs of which are buried in their legal and accounting bills, 
and which can to some extent be passed on to customers, suppliers, 
employees, and investors. 
Moreover, domestic firms will vary in the extent to which they feel 
any effects from regulatory price discrimination. A given domestic firm 
will associate differential regulatory burdens with a loss of 
competitiveness with foreign rivals only if its foreign rivals undertake 
substantial capital raising in U.S. public markets. Without numerous 
specific incidents of this lowering of foreign rivals’ costs from regulatory 
price discrimination, it is not likely to be an issue of general interest 
across corporate America.  Merritt Fox has noted, for example, that large 
U.S. issuers have voiced almost no objection to a proposal backed by the 
NYSE to relieve foreign issuers from having to reconcile their books to 
U.S. GAAP.233      U.S.  firms  are  far  more  likely  to  focus  on  product 
competition with their foreign rivals, as opposed to financing competition. 
Lobbying for tariff protection against foreign products, for example, is 
common. Lobbying to bar or impede “imports” of foreign securities 
seems less likely. 
 
C. The Calculus of International Consent 
 
In addition to the improbability of interest group alignments 
supporting issuer choice in regulatory price-setting jurisdictions, 
international issuer choice agreements will be difficult to achieve. 
Despite its offhand treatment by issuer choice advocates, the choice of 
law cooperation that would be necessary to implement private choice is 
far from trivial or easily accomplished. Besides the prospect of domestic 
interest group opposition in regulatory price-setting jurisdictions, the 
mechanics of international policy coordination suggest further hurdles 
that would have to be overcome in order for international issuer choice to 
emerge. 
 
1. INTERNATIONAL COALITIONS AND DISPERSED VETO POWER 
 
The global legal environment is “tilted against effective 




233. See Fox, Political Economy, supra note 19, at 765 & n.148. 
234. Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environmental 
Regulation, 87 GEO. L.J. 749, 761 (1999). 
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binding policy change on dissenters through the assembling of a majority 
coalition. However, assembly of the requisite coalitions  in the 
international context is much more difficult, especially in the absence of 
some pre-existing transnational institutional structure.235 
Among anarchic nations,236 the voting rule in international 
policymaking is a sort of unanimity requirement. Each state sought to be 
bound  by  treaty  must  assent  to  it.    Objecting  states  are  not  bound. 
Therefore, overcoming collective action problems among states may be 
quite a formidable task. Each state must either perceive itself a net 
winner by participating, or transfer payments must be arranged. This 
means that within each participating state, a majority coalition must exist 
that stands to benefit from participation. 
In effect, the power to veto international agreements is more widely 
available among interest groups  than with domestic  legislation. The 
existence of an opposing majority coalition in any prospective 
participating state will cause that state’s rejection of the arrangement. 
Even strategic delay by an opposing minority in one nation might scuttle 
an agreement if majority coalitions in important states cannot be held 
together long enough for an agreement to be reached. Given this context, 
the opposition of the regulatory bureaucracy in any important state could 
be fatal to the achievement of a widely accepted issuer choice treaty. 
Ideally, for an international issuer choice regime, the United States 
and other regulatory price-setting jurisdictions would participate. The 
existence of a blocking coalition within any of these jurisdictions would 
damage the prospects for achieving an issuer choice agreement,  and 
would diminish the benefits of any agreement achieved. 
 
2. COMPLEXITY OF AN INTERNATIONAL ISSUER CHOICE TREATY 
 
Even aside from the private interests in particular states that would 
oppose issuer choice, implementation of the requisite choice of law 
cooperation may be impeded by technical concerns. The terms of an 
issuer choice treaty would hardly be straightforward. Uncertainty as to 
the particular operation of securities laws under an international issuer 





235. See Frederick Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, 23 MICH.  J. 
INT’L L. 31, 90 (2001) (discussing role of international institutions in facilitating 
cooperation). 
236. “Nations dwell in perpetual anarchy, for no central authority imposes limits 
on the pursuit of sovereign interests.” Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under 
Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies, 38 WORLD POL. 1 (1985). 
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Choice of law rules are notoriously indeterminate,237 and 
international issuer choice agreements may be difficult to specify with 
particularity ex ante. The point of any issuer choice arrangement is to 
enable private parties to displace local regulation with regulation of their 
own choosing. However, transplanting a regulatory regime from its 
original context to another jurisdiction is unlikely to be a neat and tidy 
affair. Especially in industrial countries, securities regulation is fairly 
complex, depending not only on intricate rules but also on numerous 
institutions for its implementation. Not only regulators, but courts, stock 
exchanges, and self-regulating organizations all play a role. In the United 
States, each of these institutions may play a role in ex ante supervision as 
well as ex post enforcement. Importing a securities regulatory regime by 
contract or treaty will not be a straightforward enterprise. A simple 
choice of law rule requiring respect for private choice of substantive law 
does not by itself replicate the institutional arrangements that may be 
critical to a regulatory regime.238 
Any treaty committing nations to private choice would likely rely on 
imprecise standards and ex post discretion of judges or regulators. 
Regulators and their important constituents might therefore  have 
difficulty anticipating the consequences of a private choice arrangement, 
and firms might be unable to predict the effect of their private choices. 
This indeterminacy could make interest groups reluctant to support such 
agreements in the first place. 
Enforcement raises perhaps the most significant concern. 
Enforcement across jurisdictions, if workable at all, is likely to be 
difficult to specify and difficult to police. Each nation is likely to rely on 
particular legal institutions to enforce its laws, and some may be unique to 
its securities regulation. An arrangement for private choice would require 
some consideration for whether and which enforcement institutions 
“travel” with the choice of substantive law. 
The trade offs in terms of regime-selected institutions versus home- 
country enforcement have been aired. Romano and Choi and Guzman 
argue that regime-selected regulators and institutions are best situated to 




237. See Michael Whincop, The Recognition Scene: Game Theoretic Issues in the 
Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 23 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 416, 427-28 (1999) 
(identifying indeterminacy of choice of law rules as reason for absence of choice of law 
requirement for judgment recognition). 
238. “[T]he institutions necessary for effective securities regulation are not easily 
transplantable. The primary problem . . . is local enforcement and local culture in the 
receiving country, for even world-class laws need to be understood by those subject to 
them and enforced by state institutions.” Licht, supra note 129, at 679; see also Cox, 
supra note 20, at 1240 (discussing crucial interpretive role of SEC staff). 
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rules to be applied.239 Centralizing litigation and other enforcement 
activity in this way enables consistent development of the regime-selected 
law, as compared to other approaches that involve interpretation by 
various nations’ courts. Finally, the benefits of regulatory competition are 
maximized when the legislative and judicial functions come under the 
same sovereign. When authority over outcomes is split between the rule 
givers of one state and the judiciary of another, the rule-giving state is 
impeded in its ability to respond to consumer demand. It cannot 
guarantee that its regulatory product will be sufficiently nuanced to 
display all the features consumers want.240 
On the other hand, as Steven Walt notes, the conduct to be regulated, 
and which would form the basis for any lawsuit, is most likely to occur in 
the issuer’s home country. Local institutions in the home country are 
likely to be more familiar with local business practices. Therefore, the 
home country may be the most convenient venue for regulating conduct, 
gathering evidence, and realizing on the firm’s assets.241 According to 
Walt, being “on the ground” where violative conduct occurs gives home- 
country regulators a natural advantage over their foreign counterparts. It 
may be easier for home-country regulators to master the various 
substantive laws they must enforce under issuer choice than it would be 
for foreign regulators to operate in the local legal environment.242 
Conceptually, it would seem that as a matter of consistency with the 
premises of the brief for private choice, regime-selected institutions have 
one other significant factor recommending them. Enforcement must be 
seen as an integral aspect to the product itself, and if states are meant to 
be competing suppliers in an international market for regulatory products, 
then only the supplier has the right incentives to “service” the product 
properly. Not only may the issuer’s home-country institutions lack 
sufficient incentive or sufficient administrative capacity to enforce the 
regime-selected rules faithfully, but they may have incentive to do just the 
opposite. Home-country enforcers may have incentive to sabotage 
competitors’ products by tinkering with enforcement. It is not difficult to 
imagine situations in which home-country enforcers may be able to favor 




239. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 931 (recommending regime 
jurisdiction as default rule); Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 407 (same). 
240. See Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 10, at 407 & n.46. 
241. See Steven Walt, Introduction: Privatization and Its Prospects, 41 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 517, 527 (2001); see also Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 928. 
242. See Walt, supra note 241. In addition, as Jim Cox has noted, it may be 
difficult to structure appropriate incentives to encourage foreign regulators’ vigorous 
enforcement of their own laws in jurisdictions where they have no political constituents. 
See Cox, supra note 20, at 1240-41. 
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confusion over application of another state’s rules. Such an enforcement 
strategy would serve to discourage local firms from choosing non-local 
rules, advantaging the local regulatory product in the local market. 
This enforcement morass is only the most immediate question mark 
for issuer choice arrangements. The complications of enforcement 
suggest that treaties facilitating the private mixing and matching of 
regulatory regimes are not likely to be simple. An unadorned edict to 
honor firms’ private choice will not be sufficient. Negotiating agreement 
on these  issues among  multiple  states—each state  with  its own 
commercial and corporate law, culture and history, as to which any issuer 
choice regime would have to be integrated—is likely to be quite 
difficult.243 
The complexity of these issues portends not merely difficulty in 
treaty drafting, but indeterminacy as to outcomes. Even if law makers 
and their important interest groups supported private choice in theory, 
they might have difficulty predicting how such an arrangement would 
work, what national commitments would entail, and how private benefits 
would be distributed. These indeterminacies might discourage the 
establishment of such arrangements at the outset. 
Issuer choice advocates have failed to grapple with these difficulties. 
For example, while Choi and Guzman express doubt that states could 
cooperate successfully on harmonizing substantive rules,244 they fail to 




243. “A choice of law treaty is not unprecedented, although the characteristics of 
different investors and default rules might complicate the product.”  Walt, supra note 241, 
at 525. 
244. They cite insider trading rules as an example: 
[E]fforts on the part of countries to construct workable international 
cooperation in securities regulation, although fine in theory, are most likely to 
fail. In theory, countries may design efficient securities regulations through 
international cooperation that would be enforced globally. Parties engaging in 
securities fraud, for example, would find it difficult to escape enforcement 
under a perfect global regulatory regime. In practice, of course, the existing 
global regulatory regime is far from perfect. Although the SEC has met with 
some success in gaining cooperation from other countries regarding insider 
trading laws, international cooperation remains limited. Despite the facial 
success of the SEC's efforts, agreements between countries are often difficult 
and time consuming to obtain. Moreover, once agreements are signed, 
countries must expend resources monitoring compliance. For example, initial 
evidence on the insider trading laws instituted in Japan and Switzerland 
demonstrate less than vigorous enforcement. Over time, national regulatory 
bodies may take over the agreement, adding provisions and increasing the 
complexity of the regime to enhance the importance of the regulatory 
agencies. 
Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 915-16 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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require  politically  significant  cooperation  among  states,  perhaps  even 
more politically significant than substantive harmonization. 
 
D. Alternative Ending: Harmonization? 
 
The preceding discussion predicts a failure of supply in terms of 
choice of law rules that would be necessary to effect issuer choice. The 
same discussion further serves as  a roadmap to more likely political 
outcomes. 
The regulatory price discrimination strategy that the SEC to some 
extent has already pursued may generate stronger opposition from U.S. 
issuers over time. The costs to domestic issuers of differential regulatory 
burdens as compared to foreign issuers may at some point become 
sufficiently large and widespread that collective action for U.S. issuers 
will make sense. Bill Carney has predicted, for example, that pressure 
from the exchanges will lead the SEC to accept international disclosure 
standards for foreign issuers. “And once foreign issuers can avoid U.S. 
GAAP and some other burdens of U.S. regulation, can parity for U.S. 
issuers be far behind?”245 
Parity for U.S. issuers—if it does come—may take the form of 
harmonized international standards. It is not likely to lead to issuer 
choice. A prediction of harmonization, moreover, more closely comports 
with the  public  choice  assumptions  of  issuer choice  proponents. 
Harmonization and the ongoing international negotiations required to 
implement it preserve and augment regulators’ authority, prestige, and 
budget.246 International negotiations are likely to be complicated and 
technical affairs, placing the SEC and other national regulators at the 
center of international reform that is to a great extent insulated from 
political accountability.247 Jon Macey cites as one example the SEC’s 
lobbying of other states to adopt and enforce U.S.-style insider trading 
prohibitions.248 He argues that this harmonization effort was driven by 
the SEC’s desire to maintain its own authority by preventing regulated 
parties’ easy exit to more lax jurisdictions. The SEC has additionally 




245. Carney, supra note 229, at 723. 
246. See Colombatto & Macey, supra note 59 (characterizing SEC efforts at 
international coordination of insider trading enforcement as an attempt to preserve its own 
authority). 
247. See Paul Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in 
International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 743 (1999) (describing work of 
international private legislatures). 
248. See Colombatto & Macey; see also supra note 59. 
249. See id. at 953; supra Part I.A.2. 
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In addition, harmonization may provide important benefits to 
various U.S. constituencies the SEC has traditionally supported. 
Harmonization efforts will generally result in international standards 
lower than existing U.S. standards but higher than those of most other 
states. Successful harmonization may therefore drive marginal foreign 
issuers to the United States by raising their costs of issuing outside the 
United States while lowering their costs of issuing in the United States. 
The securities industry can therefore be expected to benefit from 
harmonization. 
Local lawyers and accountants would also benefit insofar as the 
value of their expertise would be preserved. Domestic securities law may 
change, but it will not be replaced wholesale by foreign law, as under 
issuer choice. Harmonization may also benefit U.S. issuers insofar as it 
raises foreign rivals’ capital costs—depending on the agreed substantive 
standards—as compared to the status quo. 
In effect, harmonization strikes a politically more acceptable 
distribution of benefits among interested parties than does issuer choice. 
The SEC’s role in securities regulation is not threatened. Its expertise and 
that of private securities lawyers and accountants remain relevant. 
Securities firms retain some of their informational and other advantages, 
and they and exchanges enjoy increased volume. Issuers get a level 
playing field with their foreign rivals. This is not to suggest that 
harmonization will necessarily be easy to achieve across the broad range 




Issuer choice proponents have raised novel and interesting arguments 
favoring regulatory competition in securities law. However, the debate so 
far is incomplete. Scholars have debated the demand side. They have 
theorized about the behavior of firms and investors in demanding optimal 
securities law. However, issuer choice proponents have yet to provide a 
full account of the supply side. In a competitive setting, it may be that 
regulators would have incentive to supply optimal rules in order to 
expand their regulatory purview and benefit favored constituents. 
However, structuring a competitive setting in the first place will require a 
special set of choice of law rules to be agreed among states. Regulators 
will have insufficient incentive to push for such rules, largely for the 
exact reasons issuer choice advocates cite for their predictions of vigorous 
competition over substantive rules in the ideal global market for law. If 
regulators value increasing prestige and scope of their regulatory 
authority, if they wish to maximize the number of regulated firms within 
their purview, then they will not readily agree to give up the territorial 
monopolies they already enjoy. 
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Legislative and executive action is possible—and would in all 
likelihood be required—in order to establish the competitive setting issuer 
choice advocates envision. However, regulators would be powerful 
opponents of any international cooperative endeavors that would weaken 
their regulatory monopolies. Other interest groups exist, but it is 
doubtful—at least in the United States and probably in other price-setting 
jurisdictions as well—that any would prefer issuer choice to the 
regulatory price discrimination that is the status quo. Moreover, the 
complexities associated with any international issuer choice treaty make 
credible commitments difficult to obtain. 
Political feasibility may seem a harsh metric against which to 
appraise normative scholarship. After all, knowing the contours of the 
first best solution is valuable though we may readily concede the 
difficulty of its implementation. Issuer choice proposals, however, 
deserve particular scrutiny in this regard because they depend critically on 
assumptions about bureaucratic behavior in an international setting, but 
much that is important about that international setting is assumed away. 
The anarchy of the international setting, so central to the work of scholars 
in international relations and other disciplines, cannot be so easily set 
aside.250 No global framework for regulatory competition exists. With 
that factored into the analysis, the assumptions ultimately show the 
improbability of the issuer choice proposal,251 as well as the probability of 
regulatory price discrimination. 
Doubting issuer choice is not to say that securities laws will not 
adapt because of competitive pressures. Others have made the case that 




250. Ironically, Choi & Guzman doubt the promise of other approaches to 
international coordination on political feasibility grounds. They are skeptical of “normal” 
reciprocity arrangements—which require an issuer selling securities in a foreign market 
merely to comply with its domestic regulatory regime. This skepticism arises in part 
because “countries typically consider such agreements only when the laws of the 
signatories are extremely similar.” Choi & Guzman, supra note 11, at 920. In addition, 
regulators fear investor confusion if securities trading on local markets were subject to 
various different regulatory regimes. “This concern typically reduces the interest of 
regulators in reciprocity arrangements, which minimizes the number of such agreements 
and their impact on regulatory competition.” Id. Presumably, though, these same factors 
impede the prospects for issuer choice reciprocity at least as much. 
251. In a related context, another scholar has observed: 
one of the difficulties presented by public-choice-oriented normative 
scholarship: what is a public choice . . . scholar to do, when the audience he is 
trying to influence, whom he is trying to get to adopt his recommendations, is 
composed of the same group of people that his own theories suggest are not 
collectively capable of pursuing the public interest? 
Kyle D. Logue, If Taxpayers Can’t Be Fooled, Maybe Congress Can: A Public Choice 
Perspective on the Tax Transition Debate, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1507, 1529 (2000). 
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issuers and the securities industry.252 The competition-driven evolution of 
national securities laws is already underway. Issuers and investors are 
mobile now to some extent and will only grow more so over time. 
However, the sort of  mobility envisioned by issuer choice advocates 
depends on international cooperation over explicit legal rules endorsing 
exit from regulatory regimes in which too many are too deeply invested. 









































252. See Coates, supra note 137, at 553. 
